Reverse burdens of proof create one of the most difficult tensions in modern criminal procedure. They may respond to evidentiary asymmetry, concealed criminal activity, or facts peculiarly within the accused’s knowledge, but they can also erode the presumption of innocence if they displace the State’s responsibility to prove guilt. This article compares Vietnam, India, and the Russian Federation through doctrinal, comparative, and case-law methods. It argues that the three systems represent distinct regulatory models. Vietnam constitutionally and procedurally places responsibility for proving crime on competent procedural authorities and does not formulate a general reverse-onus doctrine. India expressly employs reverse burdens and mandatory presumptions in general evidence law and special criminal statutes, while Supreme Court jurisprudence requires the prosecution first to establish foundational facts. Russia resembles Vietnam in criminal procedure because its Constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure expressly state that the accused need not prove innocence and that the prosecution bears the burden of accusation. At the same time, Russia has developed a separate civil anti-corruption mechanism for unexplained assets in which the evidentiary burden may shift after statutory threshold facts are shown. The article concludes that Vietnam should not transplant broad criminal reverse burdens. Instead, it should clarify foundational-fact requirements, distinguish evidential from persuasive burdens, improve judicial reasoning, and consider whether narrowly designed non-criminal asset-recovery mechanisms can address specific evidentiary problems without weakening the presumption of innocence.