This article examines legal frameworks for rehabilitating enterprises at risk of insolvency or already insolvent by comparing Vietnam’s Law on Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy No. 142/2025/QH15 with Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, the United Kingdom’s moratorium and restructuring plan, and Singapore’s restructuring regime under the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act. Using doctrinal analysis and a functional comparative method, it evaluates six components: early access, the stay, debtor governance, rescue finance, plan voting and minority coercion, and judicial confirmation. Vietnam’s 2025 Law represents a significant rescue-first shift through a standalone rehabilitation procedure, an early financial-distress trigger, supervised debtor control, priority for rehabilitation debt and simplified proceedings. Its effectiveness may nevertheless be constrained by the requirement to submit a plan at commencement, the absence of immediate interim protection before court acceptance, insufficiently articulated adequate-protection rules, the lack of creditor classification, an aggregate 65 per cent voting threshold and a narrowly framed judicial review standard. The article advances a “calibrated coercion” thesis: stays, priority alterations and majority binding are legitimate only when paired with valuation, disclosure, fair treatment and proportionate judicial safeguards. It proposes a two-stage stay, a monitored debtor-in-possession model, tiered rescue-finance priorities, class voting, conditional cross-class cramdown, a no-creditor-worse-off test, feasibility and good-faith review, pre-negotiated plans, a tailored micro- and small-enterprise pathway and fuller implementation of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency.