Public Interest Litigation (PIL) is often described as a procedural simplification that permits constitutional courts to adjudicate group claims where there are no realistic alternatives to having access to the judiciary. While this is true, this description is incomplete. For example, in India, PIL served as a connection between enforceable fundamental rights and the real world obstacles that prevented individuals from asserting those rights; i.e., poverty, social disability, the threat of reprisals, and administrative delays.

This article will describe the constitutional structure that made PIL possible, identify the doctrinal developments with regard to standing and procedure that have enabled PIL, and explain how these developments relate to the enforcement of constitutional rights, particularly Article 21. This article will also outline the central tension in PIL law; namely, while courts can provide protection for rights and require constitutional justification for decisions made by other branches of government, courts cannot substitute for representative democracy.

This article concludes that PIL is at its most legitimate when it serves as a court of last resort (or jurisdiction of necessity) for demonstrated public harm, is grounded in identifiable and articulable constitutional rights, and provides remedies that are proportional to institutional competence.