

Reconstruction of the village consultative body (BPD) empowerment law in demak district based on dignified justice

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Abstract

In the practice of village governing in the Demak Regency area as well as in other districts, there are almost the same complex problems faced by the Village Representative Body (BPD) in carrying out its duties, function, authority, and rights, this encourages the author to research that raises the problem of how to carry out reconstruction Empowerment of Village Consultative Bodies (BPD) in Demak Regency based on values of dignified justice. The writing paradigm used is constructivism with primary data sources from a number of respondents or interviews supported by secondary data from scientific literature and laws and regulations. The results of the writing show that direct election of BPD members will provide much stronger legitimacy (recognition) to BPD, rather than representative elections because this can make the BPD's position equal to the Village Government (Village Head and village officials). As for the maximum empowerment of the BPD, efforts are required to clarify the function of the BPD in budgeting, confirms the rules regarding the BPD contained in a Government Regulation, reinforces and clarifies the rights of the Village Consultative Council Leaders and members to obtain an allowance for carrying out the duties and functions of the Village Fund Allocation (ADD) of at least 10% and other allowances from the Village Fund Allocation (ADD) of at least 5 %, obtaining operational costs of at least 10% of the Village Original Income in the form of proceeds from the village's *bondo* auction every year, obtaining capacity development through education and training, socialization, technical guidance, and field visits of at least 3% of the Village Fund Allocation. and for BPD with achievements and/ or retirement benefits in the form of money at least 10% of the Village Fund Allocation or adjusted according to the financial capacity of the Village.

Keywords: reconstruction, bpd empowerment, dignified justice

Introduction

A Strong village government is not in the sense of an autocratic form of government (for example, with a long term of office), but a form of village government with democratic governance that is controlled (checks and balances) by local institutions such as the Village Representative Body (BPD). As well as elements of the local community. The author's observations show that in general, the BPD is still not optimal in carrying out these functions. In its function as the party that discusses and agrees on the draft Village Regulation (*Perdes*), the BPD is no more proactive than the Village Head. Although the draft can be submitted by the BPD, in reality, more often times the draft *Perdes* is proposed by the Village Head^[1]. In other cases, the draft *Perdes* that had been formulated and submitted by the Village Head failed to be passed because the BPD had not yet discussed it. This condition causes the village to be less productive in ratifying *perdes* outside the main *Perdes* mandated by the higher-up, namely the *Perdes* on the Village Medium-Term Development Plan

(*RPJMDesa*), the Village Income and Expenditure Budget (*APBDesa*) and the Village Government Work Plan (*RKPDesa*).

The author's rapid assessment conducted in several villages in Demak District found that the BPD are often forced to sign the Village Budget due to pressure from the Village Head. The Village Head did this because he was also forced by the District Government who felt the need to speed up the *APBDesa* formulation process so that the APBN fund transfer process could be accelerated. On the other hand, although the BPD knows that the *APBDesa* does not reflect the needs of the Village and the preparation process does not involve the Village residents, the BPD does not dare refuse to sign the *APBDesa* document in question^[2].

In terms of accommodating residents' aspirations, BPD is still less attractive to the community. This can be seen from the tendency of villagers who prefer to convey their aspirations to people who are considered close in power to the village head, with the hope that this person will convey it directly to the village head. There were also residents who

¹ Apriani, Reka & Sakban, Abdul. (2019). Kinerja Badan Permusyawaratan Desa Dalam Penyelenggaraan Pemerintahan Desa. *Civicus : Pendidikan-Penelitian-Pengabdian Pendidikan Pancasila dan Kewarganegaraan*. 6. 34. 10.31764/civicus.v6i2.672.

² Yuhandra, Erga. (2018). Kewenangan BPD (Badan Permusyawaratan Desa) Dalam Menjalankan Fungsi Legislasi, *Jurnal Ilmu Hukum, Unifikasi* Vol 3 (2) 2016. 10.25134/unifikasi.v3i2.410

complained about their aspirations to the head of the Neighborhood Association (RT/RW) or to village officials. As the supervisor of the performance of the village head, the BPD almost never seriously discusses the accountability report of the village government nor providing notes on the report. The accountability report to the district head tends to be considered more important than to the BPD because the report to the district head will have implications for approval for the next phase of village fund disbursements. In this function, there is no critical discourse put forward by the BPD on the administration of the Village government. In other cases, the village government tended to ask the district government for recommendations more than the BPD. The weak function of the BPD causes the village government, in this case, the village head, to become more dominant. It is feared that the prominent role of the village head will interfere with the check and balance mechanism so that at a further stage, Village democracy will be disrupted. In the practice of village government in the Demak Regency area for example, like many other districts throughout Indonesia, there are almost the same complex problems faced by BPD in carrying out its duties, functions, authorities, and rights. The parameters are a number of problems faced by BPD. First, the BPD does not yet understand its duties and mains. For this reason, it is felt that there is a need for provision, guidance for the BPD, either from academics, district head (*camat*), or appointed parties. Second, BPD recruitment, Usually BPD members come from ordinary people, rarely anyone is interested in registering themselves as BPD. Third, payroll, because BPD does not get a salary like a village head and his apparatus. This is one of the factors that cause the BPD to not carry out its main duties and functions properly. Every activity carried out by BPD needs to use funds, but there is no adequate budget allocation for that.

The BPD policy in carrying out its main duties and functions is in the form of Village Regulation documents such as *APB Des*, *RPJM Desa*, *RKP Des*, and Hamlet Meetings (*Musdus*) to absorb the aspirations of the people represented by the BPD, not to mention BPD's record for improvements, village administration report from the Village Head and so on.

Based on the explanation provided, it is necessary to carry out further discussion in a research with the following issues:

1. What Are The Weaknesses Of The Village Consultative Body (BPD) System In Indonesia Currently?
2. How Is The Reconstruction Of The Village Consultative Body (BPD) Based On The Value Of Dignified Justice?

Method of Research

The paradigm that is used in the research this is the paradigm of constructivism which is the antithesis of the understanding that lay observation and objectivity in finding a reality or science knowledge^[3]. Paradigm also looked at the science of social as an analysis of systematic against *Socially Meaningful Action* through observation directly and in detail to the problem analyzed.

The research type used in writing this paper is a qualitative research. Writing aims to provide a description of a society

or a certain group of people or a description of a symptom or between two or more symptoms.

Approach method used in this research is *Empirical-Juridical*^[4], which is based on the norms of law and the theory of the existing legal enforceability of a law viewpoint as interpretation.

As for the source of research used in this study are:

1. Primary Data, is data obtained from information and information from respondents directly obtained through interviews and literature studies.
2. Secondary Data, is an indirect source that is able to provide additional and reinforcement of research data. Sources of secondary data in the form of: Primary Legal Material and Secondary Legal Materials and Tertiary Legal Material.

In this study, the author use data collection techniques, namely literature study, interviews and documentation where the researcher is a key instrument that is the researcher himself who plans, collects, and interprets the data^[5]. Qualitative data analysis is the process of searching for, and systematically compiling data obtained from interviews, field notes and documentation by organizing data into categories, describing it into units, synthesizing, compiling into patterns, selecting important names and what will be studied and make conclusions.

Research Result and Discussion

Weaknesses of the Village Consultative Body (BPD) System In Indonesia Currently

It is feared that the weak function of the BPD in implementing village governance will interfere with the check and balance mechanism so that in turn, the power of the village government is more dominant. The domination of the village government will gradually undermine the role and participation of villagers, which in turn will weaken the democratic process at the village level^[6].

In light of this, the author has highlighted several problems that the BPD has often faced, both from internal and outside, namely:

a. Internal Problems

1. Weak Organizational skills. As an institution, BPD is not managed through a good organizing mechanism. From the simplest observations, there is almost no schema on the organizational structure of the BPD. On a more substantive matter, institutionally, the BPD is less visible in organizing its members which makes the members of the BPD seem to work carelessly. Of the total BPD studied, generally, only a few of the BPD members were active. There is even a BPD that consists of only the chairman and even in another village, one BPD member was inactive for up to six months, and yet there is still no institutional effort to address the problem^[7].

⁴ Johnny Ibrahim. (2005). *Teori dan Metodologi Penulisan Hukum Normatif*, Bayumedia, Surabaya.

⁵ L. Moleong. (2002). *Metode Penulisan Kualitatif*, PT Remaja Rosdakarya, Bandung.

⁶ Fakhru, Hajmi & Marlina, Lina. (2020). Peran Badan Permusyawaratan Desa Dalam Meningkatkan Demokrasi Lokal. *Pro Patria: Jurnal Pendidikan, Kewarganegaraan, Hukum, Sosial, dan Politik*. 3. 25-35. 10.47080/propatria.v3i1.772.

⁷ Abdul Qohar. (2020). Interview, a member of the BPD of Bulusari Village, Sayung District, Demak Regency on August 20, 2020.

³ Faisal. (2010). *Menerobos Positivisme Hukum*, Rangkang Education, Yogyakarta.

2. Zero Staff and Secretarial Support. Apart from the matter of organizing, the weak function of the BPD is also because institutionally the BPD is not supported by the staff managing the secretariat. The absence of secretarial and staff causes the BPD to be poorly managed as an institution. This is in contrast to the village government which has a clear institutional structure, including staff and secretarial support. Through the Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 84 of 2015 concerning Village Government Organizational Structures and Work Procedures for the Village Government structure scheme is clearly described, where the Village Government is supported by a Village Secretariat chaired by the Village Secretary who oversees the Heads of Affairs.
3. The rights given to BPD members are unclear. The issues raised in this study also include those related to the rights of BPD members. An opinion has emerged that thinks that the rights received by BPD members are still far from being received by the village head. Even though BPD should have received many rights, in practice these rights have not been fully accepted. Government Regulation Number 43 of 2014 as amended by Government Regulation Number 47 of 2015 (PP Desa), Article 78 stipulates that the leadership and members of the BPD have the right to obtain allowances for the implementation of duties and functions and other allowances in accordance with the provisions of statutory regulations; operating costs; capacity building through education and training, socialization, technical guidance, and field visits and awards from the provincial and region/ city governments for leaders and members of the BPD who excel. Of the several rights regulated by the law, only job and function allowances have been granted. Even then with an uncertain amount.
4. Lack of Personal Capacity. Individually, members of the BPD appear to lack adequate capacity directly related to their functions. For example, in their function as discussing *Perdes* draft, BPD members should have the ability in the field of legal drafting. However, in reality, it is almost certain that the majority of BPD members do not have this capability. Thus the *perdes* draft comes mostly from the village head. In terms of the supervision of the village head, many BPD members do not understand the real concept of supervision, so that what is done is only partial supervision, which is limited to supervising physical development. At the most basic level, there are also many BPD members who are less competent in communicating. In fact, as channels for community aspirations, BPD members should have good communication skills, even to the degree that they can influence others.
5. Mutual suspicion with the Village Government. The difference in views between the Village Consultative Body (BPD) and the village government is also one of the obstacles in the relationship between the Village Consultative Body (BPD) and the village government. Because every policy that is created by the village government must be consulted with the Village Consultative Body (BPD), without the approval of the Village Consultative Body (BPD) the policy cannot be issued and not to mention that Distrust is also an

obstacle. The Village Consultative Body (BPD), which has the authority to explore, collect and channel the aspirations of the community can state that they do not believe in the village government as long as the village community wants it to. However, on the other hand, the village government can also not believe whether this is purely from the village community or not. Another obstacle is the tug of war for authority. The Village Consultative Body (BPD) has the authority to propose the appointment or dismissal of the village head. If there is a conflict between the Village Consultative Body (BPD) and the village head, they can propose the dismissal of the village head.

b. External Problems

1. The problem of filling in members, filling in members of the BPD (Village Consultative Body), in Demak Regency, according to Demak Regency Regional Regulation Number 4 of 2015 concerning BPD that the stages of filling the vacancies for BPD members are through deliberation in accordance with Article 9 letter d: which entitled to attend the deliberation are the Chairman and Daily Executive of the RW, the Chairperson and the Daily Executive of the RT, and 3 (three) representatives of each RT, one of whom is a woman. So the election of BPD members is not directly by residents in the representative area but based on representation, resulting in residents in the local representative area not knowing and trusting less about people who are members of the BPD, so that when BPD carries out its function, namely "accommodating and channeling the aspirations of the Village community"; experiencing obstacles, because residents are more likely to convey their aspirations to their neighborhood association (RT-RW) and village officials rather than to BPD institutions^[8]. While BPDs do not have a place in the hearts of residents in the local area or have less legitimacy from residents.
2. Problems Regarding the Position of the BPD are not equal to the Village head. Problems regarding the Position of the BPD are not parallel with the Village head. This is in accordance with Article 23 in Law Number 6 of 2014 concerning Villages. Which reads: that the Village Government is organized by the village government. This resulted in the village government, namely the village head assisted by the village apparatus to become more dominant in all matters in determining all policies in the village. And BPD institutions are considered by the village government like other social institutions such as LKMD, RT/RW, and so on. So that the position of the BPD is very weak.
3. Problems with the limited function of BPD, in Article 55 of Law Number 6 of 2014 concerning Villages, that BPD has functions, namely 1) discussing and agreeing on the Draft Village Regulation with the Village Head; 2) accommodate and channel the aspirations of the Village community; and 3) supervise the performance of the Village Head. However, in carrying out its functions, there are many obstacles such as not having a legislative function, namely forming clear and firm

⁸Putra, Mahenda & Hapsari, Aprina. (2020). Peran Badan Permusyawaratan Desa dalam Pengelolaan Aset Desa. Jurnal Akuntansi Maranatha. 12. 109-122. 10.28932/jam.v12i1.2009.

Village regulations. However, it only has a limited function, which is limited to discussing and agreeing on is not in accordance with the proper function of the BPD, namely the legislative function. After the function is supposed to include the Article into the village law governing the authority of the BPD. Because the village law does not regulate the authority of the BPD which results in weakness. As is the case when discussing *Perdes* on *APBDes*, BPD cannot give rejection when *APBDes* is not in people's interests. In fact, the *APBDes* is still being implemented. BPD does not have a budgeting function. As a result, when the BPD discussed the *APBDES* and its Amendments, there was a debate which resulted in differences in views and when the BPD did not approve, then the *APBDES* was evaluated by the district head (*camat*) and when the *camat* agreed, the *APBDES* continued to run. And this results in the function of the BPD being weak and helpless. Even more often, it is said that the BPD is only the institution that fulfills the *APB Des* document, which is a form of Village regulation, and that can cancel only the Regent, while the BPD does not have this function, and the BPD in accommodating and channeling the aspirations of the community is less desirable by the residents. Even though the BPD is the regional representative institution in the Village, residents have more confidence in the Village Officials or people closer to the Village Head, rather than having to convey their aspirations to the BPD.

4. BPD rights in the form of benefits and BPD operations are very low, this results in the BPD's performance not being able to run optimally. In Demak, the monthly BPD allowance varies, starting from the Head of the BPD of Rp. 350,000. (Three hundred and fifty thousand rupiahs), Deputy Chairman Rp. 300,000. (Three hundred thousand rupiahs), Secretary Rp. 275,000. (Two hundred and seventy-five thousand rupiahs), and each member of the BPD each month gets an allowance of Rp. 250,000. (two hundred and fifty thousand rupiahs), however, in each village on average BPD members get an allowance from ADD of Rp. 250,000, (two hundred and fifty thousand rupiahs); while the operational BPD is taken from the *bondo* land auction in the village of each village provided that the proceeds from the village's *bondo* land auction if it is above Rp. 100,000,000 (one hundred million rupiahs) then the BPD gets 10% but is limited to a maximum of Rp. 10,000,000. (Ten million rupiah) in a year, while for villages that do not have *bondo* land, the BPD does not receive operational costs.
5. Weak regulations in BPD Settings in Government Regulations, further regulations regarding BPD are regulated in District / City Regional Regulations. This is in accordance with Article 62 paragraph (2). This is different from the Village Head and village officials, further provisions are regulated in a Government Regulation. And the Government Regulation has regulated the duties, functions, rights. Meanwhile, the PP does not regulate BPD in detail and stipulates further provisions regulated in the Minister of Home Affairs Regulation. This makes BPD, in its regulation, not legally strong because the ministerial regulations are lower in rank than its government regulations.

Reconstruction of the Village Consultative Body (BPD) Based On the Value of Dignified Justice

Since the beginning of Indonesia's independence in 1945 until now, the government has tried to create a balanced village government structure capable of implementing village autonomy. From 1945 to 2014 the government has maintained elements of village governance which included the village government and the Village Consultative Body. However, since the enactment of Law Number 6 of 2014, the government has actually eliminated the position of the Village Consultative Body as a village government. The element of not including the Village Consultative Body as part of the village administration is a form of fundamental change. This is considering that in the previous period regulations, the Village Consultative Body was always placed as an element of village administration/legislation. The placement of the Village Consultative Body as the organizing element of the village administration encourages intensive supervision of the village head. This avoids the authoritarian and corrupt village government by the village head. Placing the Village Consultative Body as an element of village administration can create a pattern of balanced relations between the village head and the Village Consultative Body. Moreover, to strengthen the relationship pattern must also be based on the principle of checks and balances.

Through the principles of recognition and subsidiarity, Law Number 6 of 2014 concerning Villages (Village Law) carries the spirit of strengthening the Village as an independent entity, namely an entity that can carry out its own affairs without excessive interference from the government (*supra desa*). In regulating its own affairs, the Village is given the authority to carry out Village governance based on democratic principles, namely villagers who have the right to be involved in the administration of the government.

The democracy in question is not a formal democracy as it is practiced at the state level, where political parties are the main instrument. Democracy here is understood as a practice that promotes consensus in every decision making, which involves villagers either directly or through representative institutions. Village democracy practices as mandated by the village law do not involve political parties as representatives of citizens but are carried out by the Village Consultative Body (BPD). In this context, empowering the BPD is important in order to strengthen Village democracy^[9]. Apart from serving as a representation of village residents, the importance of BPD in Village democracy, because BPD is an institution that is given the task of holding village meetings (*Musdes*) and village head elections (*Pilkades*). *Musdes* and *Pilkades* are two activities that provide space for villagers to be directly involved and participate in the administration of Village governance. It is through the *Musdes* and *Pilkades* that Village democratic practices are carried out. The quality of the *Musdes* and *Pilkades* thus also determines the quality of Village democracy. Considering that both activities are under the responsibility of the BPD, the quality of the BPD also determines the quality of the *Musdes* and *Pilkades*.

Through the Reconstruction of Law Number 6 of 2014

⁹Putra, Mahenda & Hapsari, Aprina. (2020). Peran Badan Permusyawaratan Desa dalam Pengelolaan Aset Desa. Jurnal Akuntansi Maranatha. 12. 109-122. 10.28932/jam.v12i1.2009.

concerning Villages and Government Regulation Number 43 of 2014 it is hoped that the BPD will truly become an institution that is equal to the village government, becomes a balance, and becomes a solution for village empowerment so that it can conform to dignified justice where this Justice, according to the classical scientific understanding, means the fulfillment of the rights of life in social relations with one another and in relation to the obligations of fulfilling the rights of one another¹⁰. The word fair can be found in the second Principle or Precept: "just and civilized". Justice is found in the second principle, namely the reality of human justice, which is the basis and soul that underlies Justice in the fifth principle / fifth principle of Pancasila: "Social justice for all Indonesian people" which must be realized in social life.

Based on the explanation above, the reconstruction of Law Number 6 of 2014 concerning villages is with the Reconstruction of the Village Consultative Body (BPD) based on the value of dignified justice, namely reconstructing law number 6 of 2014 specifically for articles related to the Village Consultative Council institution, namely that the institution position, function, and rights need to be strengthened. Therefore it is necessary to have the reconstruction of Article of the law Number 6 of 2014 concerning Villages and Government Regulations as the implementing regulations because they are currently contrary to the values of dignified justice.

Reconstruction, as mentioned above are as follows:

1. Article 1 Paragraph 4 of Law No.6 of 2014 that affirms that direct election of BPD members will allow the creation of free political space and allow for political education at the Village level As well as direct elections will provide much stronger legitimacy (recognition) to BPD, rather than elections which are carried out by means of representative deliberation.
2. Article 23, because the absence of BPD participation in the Village Government can lead to the Village Head's arbitrariness in determining policies. and when reconstructed will make the BPD equal to the Village Government (Village Head and village officials).
3. Article 55 was due to the absence of a detailed explanation of the function of the BPD in budgeting in the *RAPB Des*. Then the function must be clarified so that the BPD can bring the aspirations of the community. This means that the BPD is equated with the DPRD's function if the RAPBD does not get approval from the DPRD, then the Regent or Mayor uses the previous year's APBD. Thus the BPD has an unlimited function, but emphasizes and clarifies its function, namely the budgeting function.
4. Article 56 paragraph (1) even though it is carried out democratically, is allowed to use 2 methods, namely: 1) it can be processed through direct elections, 2) through a representative deliberation process. Article 56 paragraph 1 direct election of BPD members. Not based on representative deliberation.
5. Article 78 paragraph 2 of Government Regulation No.43 of 2014 to reinforce and clarify the rights of the Leadership and members of the Village Consultative Body to obtain operational costs of at least 10% of the

Village Original Income in the form of the proceeds from the village's *bondo* auction every year. and for villages that do not have a village's *bondo* or own but are not suitable for sale, the BPD will receive an operational cost of at least 2% of the Village Fund Allocation.

6. Article 78 paragraph 4 of Government Regulation No.43 of 2014 to reinforce and clarify the rights of Village Consultative Council Leaders and members who excel and/ or retirement benefits in the form of money at least 10% of the Village Fund Allocation or adjusted according to the financial capacity of the Village.

Then, so that BPD empowerment can be maximized, efforts are needed to clarify the function of the BPD in budgeting. confirms the rules regarding the BPD contained in a Government Regulation, reinforces and clarifies the rights of the Village Consultative Council Leaders and members to obtain an allowance for carrying out the duties and functions of the Village Fund Allocation (ADD) of at least 10% and other allowances from the Village Fund Allocation (ADD) of at least 5 %, obtaining operational costs of at least 10% of the Village Original Income in the form of proceeds from the village's *bondo* auction every year, obtaining capacity development through education and training, socialization, technical guidance, and field visits of at least 3% of the Village Fund Allocation. and for BPD with achievements and/ or retirement benefits in the form of money at least 10% of the Village Fund Allocation or adjusted according to the financial capacity of the Village.

Conclusion

1. The current weaknesses of the BPD's law are: 1) internal problem, which includes: a. Weak organization, b. Zero staff and secretarial support, c. Unclear rights for BPD members d. Lack of Personal Capacity e. Mutual suspicion with the village government 2) External problem which includes: a. Member filling problem, b. The problem regarding the BPD is not on par with the village head c. Limited BPD function problems, d. BPD rights in the form of benefits and BPD operations are very low. e. Weak BPD regulatory regulations in Government regulations.
2. Reconstruction of the Village Consultative Body (BPD) based on the value of dignified justice, namely reconstructing law number 6 of 2014 specifically for articles related to the Village Consultative Council institution, namely that the institution's position, function, and rights need to be strengthened. Therefore it is necessary to have the reconstruction of Article of the law Number 6 of 2014 concerning Villages and Government Regulations as the implementing regulations because they are currently in contrary to the values of dignified justice.

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¹⁰Widodo, Wahyu & budoyo, spto & Galang Winda Pratama, Toebagus. (2018). The Role of Law Politics on Creating Good Governance and Clean Governance for a Free-Corruption Indonesia in 2030. 10.36478/sscience.2018.1307.1311.

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