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# The urgency of establishing an oversight body for the implementation of the merit system as a follow-up to Constitutional Court Decision No. 121/PUU-XXII/2024

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**Abstract**
Law Number 5 of 2014 concerning the State Civil Apparatus (the 2014 ASN Law) establishes the State Civil Apparatus Commission (KASN) as an independent, non-structural body, free from political intervention. KASN is tasked with overseeing the code of ethics for State Civil Apparatus (ASN) personnel and ensuring the implementation of a merit-based system. With the enactment of Law Number 20 of 2023 concerning the State Civil Apparatus (the ASN Law), the President has delegated a portion of their executive authority to ministries and/or agencies responsible for government functions related to the oversight of the merit-based system. The implementing regulation for this ASN Law—Presidential Regulation (Perpres) Number 91 of 2024, which amends Presidential Regulation Number 47 of 2021 concerning the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform (Kemenpan RB)—formally assigns two oversight functions regarding the merit-based system to Kemenpan RB. Article 18, points (a) and (c), stipulates that the Deputy for State Civil Apparatus Human Resources is responsible for formulating policies and overseeing the implementation of the merit-based system, as well as monitoring and evaluating policies within the scope of ASN management. Furthermore, Presidential Regulation Number 92 of 2024 concerning the State Civil Service Agency (BKN) was issued to strengthen BKN's role in executing the technical oversight of the ASN. Through this regulation, BKN has been granted a new mandate to control the implementation of technical policies for ASN management and to oversee the application of the merit-based system. Consequently, the duties previously held by KASN have been officially transferred to Kemenpan RB and BKN.

**Keywords:** State Civil Apparatus (ASN), oversight, merit-based system, State Civil Apparatus Commission (KASN)

## Introduction

A merit system is a method that uses an individual's performance and competence as the primary basis for receiving rewards, recognition, and career advancement. The implementation of a merit system within the management of the State Civil Apparatus (ASN) is considered suboptimal. The negative consequences include a decline in the performance quality of ASN personnel and the hindrance of organizational target achievement. This situation not only harms individual ASN members but also diminishes the overall effectiveness of government administration.

Law Number 5 of 2014 concerning the State Civil Apparatus (the 2014 ASN Law) establishes the State Civil Apparatus Commission (KASN) as an independent, non-structural body free from political intervention. The KASN is tasked with overseeing the ASN code of ethics and ensuring the realization of a merit system. The President selects KASN members from a list of candidates proposed by a selection committee, which is established to recruit and screen potential members. The selection committee then submits the names of the successful candidates to the President. In the final stage, the President appoints 7 (seven) individuals from the 14 (fourteen) candidates proposed by the selection committee to serve as members of the KASN. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 26 (2), letter d of Law Number 20 of 2023 concerning the State Civil Apparatus (the ASN Law), the President may delegate a portion of their executive authority to ministries and/or agencies tasked with overseeing the implementation of the merit system.

Furthermore, pursuant to Article 70 (3) of the ASN Law, the KASN continued to carry out its duties and functions until the implementing regulations for the ASN Law were established. One such implementing regulation is Presidential Regulation (Perpres) Number 91 of 2024, which amends Presidential Regulation Number 47 of 2021 concerning the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform (Kemenpan RB). This regulation confirms the transfer of two merit-system oversight functions to the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform. Article 18, letters (a) and (c), stipulates that the Deputy for State Apparatus Human Resources is tasked with formulating policies, overseeing the implementation of the merit system, and monitoring and evaluating policies related to ASN management. Additionally, Presidential Regulation Number 92 of 2024 concerning the State Civil Service Agency (BKN) was issued to strengthen the BKN's role in executing the technical oversight of the state civil apparatus. Through this regulation, the BKN has been granted a new mandate to control the implementation of technical policies regarding ASN management and to oversee the application of the merit system. With the issuance of these two presidential regulations, the duties of the KASN have been officially transferred to the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform and the BKN. The abolition of the KASN and the reassignment of its functions are part of an effort to refine the bureaucratic system. Substantively, this framework eliminates the KASN, as all oversight functions that previously fell under its authority have now been reassigned. Presidential Regulation Number 91 of 2024 was subsequently superseded by Presidential Regulation Number

178 of 2024 concerning the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform. Article 19, letters (a) and (c), as well as Article 33 (2) of this regulation, affirm the Ministry's functions in policy formulation, merit-system oversight, and the coordination of policy implementation and ASN management.

The absence of an independent oversight body raises concerns regarding potential conflicts of interest, as the oversight function is currently carried out by an institution under the executive branch. This issue served as the basis for a judicial review petition filed with the Constitutional Court (MK) by the Association for Elections and Democracy (Perludem), the Committee for Monitoring the Implementation of Regional Autonomy (KPPOD), and Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW). In its ruling, MK Decision No. 121/PUU-XXII/2024, the Court affirmed the necessity of an independent body to oversee the merit system and granted a two-year timeframe for the establishment of an autonomous institution, free from political interference. In light of this, and to gather input on the institutional design for the oversight of the merit system—as a follow-up to the aforementioned MK decision—the Center for Legislative Drafting in the fields of Politics, Law, and Human Rights, under the Expert Body (BK) of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR RI), intends to conduct a public consultation in the form of a Focus Group Discussion (FGD) in Aceh.

**Research Method**

The research conducted for this scholarly work encompasses both doctrinal and non-doctrinal approaches. The doctrinal research involves examining and analyzing applicable regulations relevant to the subject matter, as well as reviewing existing literature—including academic journals—that addresses the issues at hand. Furthermore, non-doctrinal research was carried out, with data collected through direct field observation during a Focus Group Discussion (FGD) held as part of a public consultation by the Expert Council (BK) of the DPR-RI. In this context, the researcher acted as a semi-participant, carefully documenting the points raised by the speakers, including both the primary presenters and the discussants.

**Result and Discussion**

**a. Constitutional Court Decision No. 121/PUU-XXII/2024**

On August 28, 2024, the Association for Elections and Democracy (Perludem), the KPPOD, and ICW granted power of attorney to several advocates—members of the Coalition for Civil Servant (ASN) Neutrality—to file a petition for judicial review of Law Number 20 of 2023 concerning the ASN Law with the MK. The grounds or arguments presented by the first petitioner are as follows:

1. According to the petitioner, the provisions set forth in Article 26 (2), letter d, and Article 70 (3) of the ASN Law contradict the principles of a state governed by the rule of law—specifically regarding the protection and guarantee of human rights, the realization of the nation's aspirations, and the fulfillment of the state's objectives as enshrined in the Preamble to the UUD 1945. This also relates to the implementation of good governance, which includes the establishment of a state institution—akin to a national commission—tasked with overseeing the state civil apparatus. Such an apparatus must possess integrity, professionalism, neutrality, and freedom from political intervention; it must be free from corruption, collusion, and nepotism, while being capable of providing public services and serving as a unifying force for the nation, grounded in Pancasila and the UUD 1945.

2. The issues addressed in this petition concern the removal of oversight regarding the merit system, as well as the principles, codes of ethics, and codes of conduct for ASN — a situation that creates legal uncertainty. Furthermore, the petition concerns the elimination of independent oversight over neutrality, particularly in the context of the 2024 Simultaneous Regional Head Elections (Pilkada). Given these issues, filing this petition is a matter of great urgency; the current situation threatens to weaken a professional, high-integrity bureaucracy rooted in meritocracy—a system essential for achieving good governance that is professional and free from corruption, collusion, and nepotism.

3. The existence of a bureaucratic merit system—supported by independent oversight—is necessary to safeguard independence and neutrality. The specific articles of the ASN Law challenged in this petition have caused, or at the very least have the potential to cause, direct or indirect harm to the Petitioner's constitutional rights. These articles have created legal uncertainty, undermined Indonesia's system of the rule of law, and threaten to hinder a bureaucratic structure that should guarantee equal opportunity for all within the government—a constitutional safeguard for citizen participation and modern democracy, as enshrined in Article 1 (3) and Article 28D (1) and (3) of the UUD 1945.

   Furthermore, efforts to advance democracy and bureaucratic reform—specifically in the context of election administration in Indonesia, including the establishment of an independent oversight body to monitor the neutrality of (ASN) personnel—have been hindered by provisions within the ASN Law. This obstruction infringes upon the Petitioner's constitutional rights as guaranteed under Article 28C (2) of the UUD 1945.

4. The provisions in the ASN Law will have serious repercussions for the conduct of regional head elections and general elections more broadly. The removal of oversight regarding the merit system, as well as the principles, codes of ethics, and codes of conduct for ASN personnel, creates legal uncertainty. The elimination of independent oversight concerning the neutrality of ASN personnel—which is essential for ensuring the integrity of regional head elections—is particularly concerning. Oversight of the ASN merit system must be anchored in a clear legal framework; this is necessary to foster a professional, high-integrity civil service that adheres to meritocratic principles, thereby achieving good governance—a professional administration free from corruption, collusion, and nepotism.

Consequently, these provisions threaten the integrity of free and fair regional head elections by failing to prevent the mobilization of ASN personnel for partisan electoral interests. The absence of an independent oversight mechanism means there is no system in place to prevent, address, or penalize such violations.

Furthermore, Petitioner II argues that:

1. As an oversight body for the merit system, the neutrality of civil servants (ASN), and codes of ethics and conduct, the KASN serves as a strategic pillar for enhancing the quality of public services and regional competitiveness. High-quality civil servants—produced through a meritocratic system and operating with neutrality in the execution of their core duties and functions—provide optimal services in accordance with prevailing laws and regulations. Consequently, the abolition of the KASN hinders efforts to increase its contribution toward the optimization of regional autonomy.

2. Regarding the oversight of civil servant neutrality, the KASN creates space for collaboration and citizen participation, whether on an individual or collective (organizational) basis. The existence of the KASN provides broad access for such participation in monitoring the neutrality of civil servants. This access serves as a gateway for citizens to help safeguard the neutrality of civil servants—a crucial pillar for improving public service performance. Therefore, the abolition of the KASN undermines the Petitioner's ability to participate optimally in efforts to improve public services, which is a primary pathway toward achieving the ultimate goal of regional autonomy: public welfare.

Finally, Petitioner III submits their petition based on the following grounds:

1. That the external mission of the ICW (Indonesian Corruption Watch) is to advocate for policy reform and law enforcement, and to empower the public to participate in policy-making and oversight processes. This is intended to ensure the protection of citizens' rights in realizing a political, legal, economic, and bureaucratic system free from corruption, grounded in social and gender justice.

2. The Petitioner's involvement in this application represents a concrete effort to restore constitutional rights—specifically addressing the removal of oversight regarding the merit system, the principles, and the codes of ethics and conduct for State Civil Apparatus (ASN), which has created legal uncertainty. Furthermore, it concerns the elimination of independent oversight over neutrality, particularly in the context of the upcoming simultaneous regional elections (Pilkada). The Petitioner views this as an urgent matter, given that these issues could weaken a professional, integrity-driven bureaucracy rooted in meritocracy—a system essential for achieving good governance that is professional and free from corruption, collusion, and nepotism. Consequently, efforts to empower the public to participate in policy-making and oversight—aimed at fostering a political, legal, economic, and bureaucratic system free from corruption and grounded in social and gender justice—have been obstructed.

Based on the explanation above, it is clear that, in the view of the petitioners, the KASN should be strengthened rather than dissolved. The primary basis for this argument is the strategic role KASN plays in upholding the neutrality of state civil servants (ASN)—a vital component of a healthy democracy. The analysis presented by the petitioners highlights KASN's positive track record in addressing neutrality violations, as well as the support it has garnered from civil society, which reflects public trust in the institution. Furthermore, there remains an opportunity to reform and enhance KASN's functions. Conversely, dissolving KASN risks creating a lack of oversight and an increase in neutrality violations, which could, in turn, erode public trust in the government. Instead, the government should focus on increasing resources, improving outreach, and strengthening collaboration with the public. The existence of KASN is essential and crucial for fostering better, more principled governance.

The considerations of the Constitutional Court justices in their ruling include the following:

Under Law No. 5 of 2014, the "Merit System" is defined as a policy and management framework for state civil servants based on qualifications, competencies, and performance—applied fairly and equitably, without regard to political background, race, skin color, religion, origin, gender, marital status, age, or disability. Meanwhile, the ASN Law defines the Merit System as the implementation of an ASN management framework consistent with the principles of meritocracy. Although the definitions differ, the core objective of the Merit System in both laws remains the same: to ensure fair, non-discriminatory management of state civil servants. In this context, ASN management must be conducted based on qualifications, competencies, and performance, free from political interference. Consequently—for instance, during elections—the neutrality of state civil servants can be maintained, as they remain insulated from the influence of specific political interests or parties while carrying out their duties and providing public services.

The Merit System is a fundamental principle in the management of the ASN, establishing competence, qualifications, and performance as the primary criteria for the recruitment, promotion, and performance evaluation of civil servants. As such, the merit system serves as a strategic endeavor to cultivate a professional, competent bureaucracy, free from political interference.[1]

The Merit System embodies the spirit of fairness and rationality within modern bureaucratic governance, ensuring that individuals secure positions and rewards based on objective capabilities rather than subjective factors—such as political proximity, personal relationships, or non-professional loyalties. In a democratic governance context, the Merit System functions as an ethical and institutional mechanism to uphold the neutrality of the ASN, strengthen the professionalism of public officials, and foster a performance-driven culture oriented toward public service and the equitable achievement of national goals. Furthermore, the Merit System is not merely a technocratic instrument for human resource management; it also possesses normative and philosophical dimensions that affirm the principles of equality and respect for individual dignity.

Through the merit system, the state asserts that public office is a trust that must be held by individuals possessing competence and integrity—not by those benefiting from social privilege or specific political affiliations. Consequently, the Merit System stands as an antithesis to patrimonial bureaucratic practices, which tend to breed inequality, inefficiency, and structural corruption. The effective implementation of the Merit System also bolsters public trust in the government, as citizens can see that public services are delivered by professionals focused on performance rather than personal or factional interests. Therefore, the Merit System serves not only as an administrative framework but also as an ethical foundation for modern governance—placing professionalism and integrity at the very heart of achieving a clean, effective, and equitable system of government. Based on the explanation above, the Constitutional Court has declared that Article 26 (2), letter d of the ASN Law is contrary to the UUD 1945 and lacks binding legal force, unless it is interpreted to mean: “the oversight of the implementation of the Merit System—including the oversight of the application of the principles, core values, code of ethics, and code of conduct for the ASN - which is to be carried out by an independent institution.” This independent institution must be established no later than 2 (two) years from the date this Constitutional Court ruling is pronounced. Given that this ruling was pronounced on October 1, 2025, the aforementioned independent institution must be established by September 30, 2027.

**b. Follow-up to Constitutional Court Ruling No. 121/PUU-XXII/2024**

As outlined above, the independent body tasked with overseeing the implementation of the principles, core values, codes of ethics, and codes of conduct for ASN - as well as the application of the merit system—must be established within a maximum period of two (2) years from the date of the Constitutional Court’s ruling, pursuant to MK Decision No. 121/PUU-XXII/2024, delivered on October 1, 2025. Given that the ruling was issued on October 1, 2025, the aforementioned independent body must be established no later than September 30, 2027.

In response to this MK Decision, the Center for Legislative Drafting in the fields of Politics, Law, and Human Rights—under the Expert Body of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia (BK DPR-RI)—has taken steps to implement the ruling. Specifically, from August 2 to August 4, 2026, the BK DPR-RI conducted a public consultation in the form of a Focus Group Discussion (FGD) in Aceh, hosted by the Faculty of Law at Syiah Kuala University (FH USK) in Banda Aceh. This initiative was intended to gather input regarding the institutional design of the oversight body for the merit system, in accordance with Constitutional Court Decision No. 121/PUU-XXII/2024.

The public consultation FGD was held at the Faculty of Law, Syiah Kuala University, featuring key speakers from the university itself and the Aceh Civil Service Agency. Additionally, the session was attended by various faculty members from several higher education institutions in Aceh—comprising both public and private universities—who participated as discussants. The opinions and input provided by these speakers included the following:

**1. Prof. Dr. Iskandar A. Gani, S.H., M.Hum. (Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, Syiah Kuala University)**

According to the Professor Dr. Iskandar A. Gani, S.H., M.Hum., the proposed institutional structure is an independent "State Auxiliary Body," positioned on par with other independent state commissions. It would be led by a chair and comprise several commissioners—at least five or seven individuals—to prevent decision-making deadlocks. To carry out comprehensive oversight of the bureaucracy, extending down to the local level, regional or provincial representative offices would be established. Regarding institutional relations, the central body would coordinate with the President, while regional representative offices would coordinate with the central body. To ensure accountability, the institution must remain independent and submit an annual performance report—which shall be transparent and accessible to the public—to the House of Representatives (DPR) and the President. [2]

**2. Aceh Civil Service Agency**

According to the Aceh Civil Service Agency, legal facts indicate that the Constitutional Court (MK) has responded to a civil petition by mandating that the state establish an independent body to oversee the merit system. This body must be autonomous and strictly free from political intervention. Consequently, the selection or recruitment process for its members must be designed to ensure public participation while minimizing the influence of political elites. Furthermore, the body must be granted "security of tenure"—with rigid and proportionate criteria for dismissal—to prevent its members from being easily removed due to political interference.[3]

**3. Dr. Ria Fitri, S.H., M.Hum. (Lecturer, Faculty of Law, USK)**

As a discussant, Dr. Ria Fitri, S.H., M.Hum. noted that the KASN suffers from numerous weaknesses. While the new ASN Law is generally sound, critical provisions have been omitted, effectively compromising the independence of the KASN. Any future body must be insulated from political influence, ensuring it remains free, autonomous, and detached from the centers of power. In its role of overseeing and developing the state civil apparatus, this body should function as a decisive authority—empowered to issue binding rulings and impose sanctions—rather than merely providing recommendations. This model would be similar to the Election Organization Ethics Council (DKPP), which possesses the authority to enforce its decisions.[4]

**4. Iqbal Ahmady, S.IP., M.IP. (Lecturer, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, USK)**

In practice, a lack of neutrality has emerged within the bureaucracy, driven by political elements embedded in the exercise of power. This gives rise to the "spoils system," in which public offices or specific positions are awarded to individuals who share a particular connection with those in power—such as personal closeness, family ties, friendships, or affiliation with the ruling political party (including members of a political campaign team). It is this phenomenon of campaign team members that ultimately leads to "quid pro quo" politics—a system of political patronage or rewards.[5] The spoils system stands in direct contrast to the "merit system," under which public positions are filled by individuals who possess specific qualifications

and demonstrated competence. In the merit system, recruitment, promotion, and personnel management are based on performance; in other words, the management of personnel is conducted through a structured human resources management system.[6]

5. **Prof. Muhammad Siddiq Armia, M.H., PhD. (Lecturer at the Faculty of Sharia and Law, UIN Ar-Raniry)**

According to Prof. Muhammad Siddiq Armia, M.H., PhD., not all issues can be resolved by permanent institutions. There is a choice to be made regarding the type of institution to be utilized; options include permanent institutions, assessment bodies, and ad hoc (temporary) institutions.[7] The effectiveness of any of these institutions in addressing specific problems depends entirely on the authority granted to them.

6. **Dr. Arnita, S.H., M.Hum. (Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, Universitas Malikussaleh);**

According to Dr. Arnita, S.H., M.Hum., the KASN serves as a vital independent oversight body. Data from 2020 to 2023 reveals that KASN identified 1,711 instances of civil servants (ASN) violating neutrality requirements. Of these, 1,490 individuals—representing 87.1% of the total—were subjected to sanctions imposed by their respective Personnel Management Officers (PPK). During the 2024 simultaneous elections, KASN received 417 reports concerning alleged neutrality violations by civil servants. Following investigations, 197 civil servants were found to have committed violations, leading to recommendations that they be sanctioned by the PPK within their respective institutions. Furthermore, in 2024, KASN assessed the implementation of the merit system across 617 government agencies. The results indicated that 208 agencies were rated as "poor," 78 as "fair," 236 as "good," and 95 as "very good." Consequently, 286 agencies remain in the "poor" or "fair" categories, a situation attributed to an uneven understanding and lack of knowledge regarding the merit system.[8]

Public participation is crucial to ensuring that any independent oversight body established for the merit system remains entirely free from political intervention. Civil society can play a significant role by monitoring legislation, engaging in policy advocacy, and promoting transparency and accountability throughout the establishment process of such a body—thereby ensuring that the constitutional spirit underlying the relevant legal ruling does not remain merely at the normative level. [9]

Legislators must earnestly undertake cross-sectoral regulatory harmonization as an integral part of the legislative process. Several existing laws require alignment to prevent overlapping authority, inconsistent norms, or regulatory gaps—all of which could undermine the effectiveness of the new institution. First, harmonization with Law Number 20 of 2023 concerning the State Civil Apparatus (ASN) is necessary; this law should be revised concurrently—specifically Article 26 (2), letter d—to explicitly mention the independent institution and clarify the division of functions among the independent oversight body, the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform (KemenPANRB), and the State Civil Service Agency (BKN), thereby avoiding duplication or gaps in authority. Second, harmonization with Law Number 30 of 2014 concerning Government Administration is required, particularly regarding the authority to issue binding recommendations and the mechanism for resolving administrative disputes should an Appointing Official (PPK) fail to comply with the independent institution's recommendations. Without such harmonization, the independent institution's recommendations risk suffering the same fate as those of the former KASN—frequently ignored by Appointing Officials due to the absence of an effective enforcement mechanism. Third, harmonization with Law Number 25 of 2009 concerning Public Services is essential, given that the performance of state civil servants in delivering public services is directly linked to the implementation of the merit system and the code of ethics—the very areas subject to oversight by this new institution. Fourth, any provisions concerning the protection of state civil servants who report violations of the merit system must be synchronized with Law Number 13 of 2006 concerning the Protection of Witnesses and Victims. This comprehensive synchronization is vital to ensure that the oversight system for state civil servants is not merely normatively robust within a single statute, but is also coherent and consistent across the entire national legal framework.[10]

7. **Rusnin, S.H., M.H. (Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, Universitas Muhammadiyah Aceh)**

Rusnin, S.H., M.H., concurs with Dr. Ria Fitri, S.H., M.Hum. (a lecturer at the Faculty of Law, USK), arguing that the decisions made by the oversight body for the State Civil Apparatus (ASN) should not merely serve as recommendations. Instead, the body must function as an authoritative decision-making entity with the power to impose sanctions. Furthermore, the functions of this institution must be clearly and concretely defined. [11]

These are some of the opinions and inputs provided during the Public Consultation Focus Group Discussion (FGD) with the Expert Body (Badan Keahlian) of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR-RI), held at the Faculty of Law, Syiah Kuala University, Banda Aceh, from August 2 to 4, 2026. These opinions and inputs will serve as a primary focus for the DPR-RI's Expert Body—specifically its Center for Legislative Drafting in the fields of Politics, Law, and Human Rights—as it prepares to follow up on the Constitutional Court's Decision No. 121/PUU-XXII/2024. Consequently, the establishment of an oversight body for the implementation of the merit system—tasked with monitoring the State Civil Apparatus (ASN)—has become a matter of great urgency.

**Conclusion**

The 2014 UU ASN stipulates that the oversight of the ASN Code of Ethics and the assurance of a merit-based system are to be carried out by an independent, non-structural body free from political intervention. To this end, the 2014 Law established such a body, known as the KASN. With the enactment of the 2023 UU ASN, the President has delegated a portion of his executive authority to ministries and/or agencies responsible for overseeing the implementation of the merit system. The implementing regulation for this law—Presidential Regulation (Perpres) No. 91 of 2024, which amends Perpres No. 47 of 2021 concerning the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform (Kemenpan RB)—formally assigns two merit-system oversight functions to the Ministry.

The KASN holds a strategic position in safeguarding the neutrality of the ASN—a critical element for maintaining a healthy democracy. For this reason, Perludem, KPPOD, and ICW have authorized a group of advocates—organized under the "Coalition for ASN Neutrality"—to file a petition for a judicial review of the Law on the ASN with the MK. This action was taken because they argue that Article 26 (2), letter d of the ASN Law—which effectively abolishes the KASN—is in conflict with the 1945 Constitution. In reality, the KASN has a positive track record in addressing violations of neutrality and has garnered support from civil society, reflecting public trust in the institution.

In its ruling (Decision No. 121/PUU-XXII/2024), the MK affirmed the necessity of an independent body to oversee the merit system, granting a two-year period to establish an entity that is autonomous and free from political interference. It is against this backdrop that the Center for Legislative Drafting in the fields of Politics, Law, and Human Rights—under the Expert Agency (BK) of the House of Representatives (DPR RI)—conducted a public consultation in the form of a FGD in Aceh. The objective was to gather input regarding the establishment of an oversight body for the implementation of the merit system within the civil service, in accordance with the mandate set forth in the MK Decision No. 121/PUU-XXII/2024.

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