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Communitarianism and global justice: Possibilities and challenges

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Abstract
This research paper presents the theoretical conflicts and potential synergies between communitarian political philosophy and the contemporary theory of global justice. Raised by Michael Walzer, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre, communitarianism suggests its own values founded on associative obligations and democratic self-determination as opposed to universal justice. Universal distributive justice principles that cut across boundaries are advocated by cosmopolitan theorists such as Thomas Pogge, Charles Beitz and Simon Caney, on the equal moral value of all individuals.

The article looks at the role of communitarian understanding in contributing to the solutions of such global problems as extreme poverty, climate change, forced migration and structural economic inequalities. It asserts that communitarianism can play necessary roles by emphasizing on democratic legitimacy in international politics, developing cultural pluralism and local version of rights and providing motivational realism by binding international obligations to compelling local narratives. However, communitarianism is deficient in the explanation of cross-border duties when international institutional arrangements are systematically dependent on the disfigurement of distant others, and of cultural relativism, which can aggressive the global protection of human rights.

The paper addresses hybrid models, like the so-called rooted cosmopolitanism, the Iris Young social connection model, which adheres to the interests of communitarianism in membership and democratic participation without prejudice to the powerful world pressures that accompany interdependence and complicity in structural injustice. It concludes that responsible global justice models must include cosmopolitan recognition of the equal moral worth and communitarian focus on community, custom and lawful autonomy, which operate via multilevel governance that guarantees afflicted populations real voice and maintenance of human dignity.

Keywords: Communitarianism, global justice, cosmopolitanism, democratic self-determination, cultural pluralism, structural injustice, universal human rights

Introduction

Debate on global justice today is fundamentally found on a deep tension between two rival moral and political philosophies, namely, cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. Not only does this theoretical divide systematize the scholarly discourse, it also has a significant influence on how the real world policy-making process in the context of international development, humanitarian intervention, mitigating climate change, and controlling global migration is conducted by the fact that our most basic commitments are constituted by belonging to certain communities and types of existence [1].

In its forms, cosmopolitanism holds that all human beings possess the highest unit of moral concern and postulates the principle of justice to be applied equally, with or without contingency, across national, cultural and communal boundaries [2]. According to prominent cosmopolitan theorists Charles Beitz, Thomas Pogge, Simon Caney, and Peter Singer, people's equal moral worth creates duties of fairness that transcend temporary state boundaries [3]. By claiming that global economic interdependence creates a structure of social cooperation similar to domestic societies, Beitz adapts Rawls' theory of justice to be relevant internationally and thereby applies distributive justice principles beyond national borders [4]. In his development of institutional cosmopolitanism, Thomas Pogge contends that wealthy nations and people participate in a global institutional order that inevitably and preventable leads to extreme poverty, in violation of negative commitments not to injure [5].

Michael Sandel sharply criticizes the Rawlsian vision of the unencumbered self, and believes that the primary moral principles are historically specific to culture and must be understood in the light of the constitutive relationships of particular communities [6]. The Rawlsian concept of the unfettered self is criticized by Michael Sandel, who holds that people are formed by communal affinities and that our highest moral obligations are founded on these formative relationships rather than free will or reason [7]. Alasdair MacIntyre contends that contemporary liberal attempts to develop universal principles of justice are either inevitably unsuccessful or secretly impose local presumptions, and that moral reasoning is only understandable within forms of life that are defined by tradition [7]. According to Michael Walzer's pluralistic theory in Spheres of Justice, distributive principles are historically distinctive and need to be understood in light of the common understandings of individual communities [8].

The communitarians say that attempts at imposing universal conceptions of justice in the context of different cultures is what results in moral imperialism and is a failure to respect democratic self-determination of peoples to follow their own values and set up institutions accordingly [8]. In an increasingly globalized world where interdependence is heightened by flows of people, capital, information, and the environment, this struggle becomes even more apparent [9]. Although political power and democratic responsibility are primarily structured at bounded states and specific communities, issues like extreme global poverty, anthropogenic climate change, forced migration of over 100

million people worldwide, and pandemic threats appear to require transboundary normative frameworks [10].

The paper discusses the question of whether and how communitarian insights can be brought into reconciliation or be integrated appropriately into contemporary projects of global justice. These two main research questions are: First, is communitarian political philosophy useful in any way in resolving the immediate problems of world justice or is particularism inherently dysfunctional in meeting the normative principles needed to redistribute the world? Second, are there theoretical and practical possibilities of hybrid structures that can remain communitarian interests and acknowledge strong cross-border commitments in an interdependent world?

Theoretical Foundations

1. Communitarianism: Key Pronouncements

Communitarianism is a heterogeneous group of philosophical criticisms of liberal individualism and the enlightenment project of basing morality on abstract, universal reason [11]. It is internally heterogeneous in that communitarian thinkers believe that persons are not pre-political isolated selves disembodied of social contexts but are constituted by the communities, traditions, narratives and social practices within which they exist [11]. This is a normative claim to the effect that moral and political reasoning cannot and should not be carried out by an Archimedean point outside of social contexts but invariably interpretive, contextual, and enmeshed in shared meanings unique to certain political groupings [7].

Michael Sandel has put forward a critique of John Rawls which puts forth perhaps the best statement concerning communitarian concerns: A Theory of Justice [12]. Rawls's A Theory of Justice makes use of original position a hypothetical situation, where free and equal individuals behind a veil of ignorance, filtering their identities, social stations and conceptions of the good, would in unanimous agreement agree on justice principles [12]. The impartiality of such a methodology is ensured by the fact that it is not based on instincts of morality, such as race, position, gender and natural talents [12]. However, Sandel claims that this model presupposes an unencumbered self whose identity is developed independently of and prior to social ties [7]. He contends that this idea is both normatively problematic and descriptively incorrect, as our biggest moral commitments—to our families, nations, and religious communities—are not the result of our choices but rather form the basis of who we are [7]. The moral relevance of the non-voluntary tasks we have simply by virtue of our identity cannot be explained by an agency model in which every purpose is subject to revision [7].

The criticism of Alasdair MacIntyre is aimed against epistemological conditions of moral thinking. MacIntyre believes that the Enlightenment project to root morality in tradition-free and universally applicable rational principles has been a failure and has produced moral incoherence and endless arguments about morality within modern liberal societies [6]. Modern moral discourse consists of incommensurable fragments of inherited moral traditions the Aristotelian teleology, Kantian deontology, and utilitarian consequentialism which generate and result in irresolvable moral disputes [6]. Only within tradition-constituted forms of life, such as cohesive belief and practice systems that offer conceptual resources, common norms of rationality, and model examples for stating and defending moral claims, can moral reasoning be understood, according to MacIntyre [6]. Virtues are not abstract; rather, they are implied by certain past cultural behaviours. MacIntyre thus criticizes liberal aspirations to develop universally applicable beliefs for all rational beings, regardless of past cultures and communal ties [6].

Michael Walzer's Spheres of Justice, which blends substantive pluralism and interpretive methodology, offers one of the most methodical communitarian theories of distributive justice [8]. Distributive justice principles, according to Walzer, are interpretations of the social meanings of goods within particular political communities rather than being drawn from abstract thinking [8]. Distinct communities have distinct definitions of certain things, such as political power, healthcare, and education, and these definitions dictate equitable distribution [8]. Walzer promotes multidimensional equality, arguing that justice calls for no one good—particularly financial or political power—to predominate in all areas [8]. Benefits in one area might lead to dominance in another, which undermines the products' distinct social meaning and results in injustice [8]. Walzer is blatantly communitarian: rather than imposing rules from outside the community, the theorist must articulate its own implicit understandings [8].

Charles Taylor makes some comments on identity, recognition and multiculturalism. Taylor argues that modern identity is dialogical, i.e. produced by recognition by significant others and the wider community, and that misrecognitions can bring real harm, through a falsified understanding of individual identity, of cultural, religious, and linguistic communities [13]. This brings about a politics of recognition such that justice requires not just equal treatment but recognition and respect of individual identities of cultural, religious and linguistic communities [13].

Three key features of communitarianism come out, which are (i) Moral Particularism-justice is seen in terms of shared understandings of concrete political communities as opposed to abstract universal principles [11]; (ii) Priority of Associative Obligations-we owe more duties to compatriots and co-members than to strangers [11]; (iii) Scepticism Towards Universalism-there is strong scepticism about thick universal principles which claim to bind all societies without regards to their cultural or political traditions [11].

2. Cosmopolitan Theories of Global Justice

Despite their internal diversity, cosmopolitan theories have three prosaic commitments; the first is to individualism, to the second is to universality, and to the third are generality [14]. Moral principles are universally applicable, and the ultimate units of moral concern are individuals rather than collectivises [14]. These responsibilities give rise to the main cosmopolitan argument: the fundamental rules that regulate the structure of domestic society need to apply abroad, governing international organizations that have a big influence on people's chances in life [14].

The Law of Peoples by John Rawls lies between the positions of cosmopolitanism and statism [15], in which the thinker applies the principles of his social contract to the international system, but with certain modifications that distinguish his international theory, based on domestic political culture [15]. Rawls does not support the idea of global distributive egalitarianism, claiming that the existence of inequalities between the peoples is caused by

domestic political culture rather than by unfair distributive arrangements of the world [15]. People's independence, respect for human rights, and obligations to support burdened societies are among the eight guiding principles of the resultant Law of Peoples [15]. Importantly, Rawls rejects global distributive egalitarianism, arguing that inequalities among peoples result primarily from domestic political culture rather than unfair global arrangements [15].

One of the most convincing cosmopolitan critiques is provided by Thomas Pogge, who argues that rich states actively engage in a global institutional order of trade rules, intellectual property regimes, financial systems predictably and avoidably generating severe poverty, which is therefore an institutional violation of negative duties not of harm [5]. Pogge comes to the conclusion that extreme poverty is not a natural state but rather the result of social institutions, particularly international ones, and that workable alternatives would greatly lessen poverty without placing unjustified demands on the rich [5]. In order to fund development and the fight against poverty, he suggests a Global Resources Dividend, which would be a tiny tax on the extraction of natural resources [16]. Pogge's institutional cosmopolitanism posits a broad global responsibility based on specific allegations of injury, culpability, and collective accountability for unjust institutional arrangements, rather than generic beneficence [5].

Charles Beitz takes the domestic theory of Rawls and extends it to the international level, arguing that massive economic interdependence around the world generates social cooperation that resembles that of domestic societies, which generates the distributive justice principles [3], but he does not view individual persons as units of concern: the international difference principle holds that inequalities between nations are just when they advantage the least well-off in the world [17].

Caney develops a single theory of cosmopolitanism which includes global distributive justice, climate change, humanitarian intervention and global governance [14]. Caney distinguishes cosmopolitan equality of opportunity, people deserve equal life opportunities regardless of their morally unimportant attributes such as country of birth [14]. Caney supports subsistence emissions rights and the priority of the poor in climate justice [18].

Peter Singer suggests a utilitarian argument to large-scale global obligations by use of avoiding bad consequences wherever feasible without relinquishing anything of equal or comparable moral relevance [19]. Singer drowning kid argument argues that geographical distance does not matter at all in terms of its moral significance and that responsibilities to distant strangers are morally identical to responsibilities to a drowning child who is near [19]. Until the marginal value of additional transfers matches the marginal disutility to donors, Singer's demanding strategy may require substantial redistribution [19].

The contemporary cosmopolitan theories are minimalist versus maximalist. Cosmopolitan egalitarians affirm universal human rights and humanitarian obligations but deny robust global distributive egalitarianism [14]. Cosmopolitan egalitarians propose that, based on equal moral value, and far-reaching effects of international institutions, the principles of global distributive justice should be like those of domestic distributive justice [14].

3. Cosmopolitan-Communitarian Divide

There are three dimensions of theoretical differences between cosmopolitan and communitarian approaches. First, on the scope and justification of principles, cosmopolitans hold that justice principles are global because due to moral equality of persons, geographical boundaries have no moral content, and justice institutions are constitutive structures which must be justified to everyone interested [10]. Communitarians evacuate that justice principles are interpretive, which are manifested by shared understandings in certain communities, and that justice is plural and have varying levels of legitimacy across communities [11].

Second, on moral subjects and units of concern, cosmopolitans think of persons as ultimate units of moral concern; states and peoples are secondary instruments protecting their interests [11]; and communities are the locus of moral significance and can only be understood as entities belonging to a community [11].

Third, about associative obligations and biases, cosmopolitans acknowledge that there exist special obligations that may be partial but within a framework of universal moral duties that we owe to everyone [2]. Communitarians believe that the constitutive relationships that form our identities, and which we can be reducible to voluntary commitments [8].

These theoretical differences generate an effective conflict on global redistribution, humanitarian intervention, migration and climate justice [14]. But the cosmopolitan-communitarian disagreement does not have to be understood as absolute dichotomy. Cosmopolitan thought may be reinforced by communitarian thought as to democratic legitimacy, cultural pluralism and motivational realism, and cosmopolitan consideration of structural injustice and universal vulnerability may put communitarian parochialism to the school [5]. The issue for contemporary global justice theory is to articulate institutions and values that uphold both the legitimate diversity of societies' self-perceptions and the universal moral bounds of human dignity. This calls for ongoing communication across boundaries rather than one-sided victory [14].

Communitarians contributions to global justices

Although there are basic theoretical contradictions, communitarian political thought presents good idea of contribution to the world justice debate that negligence by cosmopolitan theorists. This part explores communitarianism as an asset rather than a barrier that can teach, chastise and empower the cosmopolitan responses to transnational injustices. There are three key contributions that can be discussed in more detail: democratic self-determination and political legitimacy, cultural pluralism and need to understand universal norms in context, and emphasis on motivational realism and political plausibility in promoting global justice claims [20].

1. Democratic self-determination and Legitimacy

One of the most significant contributions of communitarianism is that it demands that political communities have valid claims to determine their fate by acting democratically and that global justice plans that disregard this claim can prove destructive to the very agency and self-determination that they are supposed to protect [20].

This is best expressed by Michael Walzer, who contends that the right to self-determination of political communities

is a prime good—possibly the most fundamental collective good—without which other goods lose their meaning or value to human possessors [21]. According to Walzer, peoples are free to create their own social, economic, and political institutions in accordance with their own collective ideas of justice and the good life, so long as they uphold the most basic universal human rights against heinous abuses such as mass starvation, slavery, genocide, and torture [8]. This right to collective self-determination is intrinsic rather than merely instrumental—useful because it is likely to result in better outcomes—because political justice is constituted by a people's ability to govern themselves, make decisions about their common life, and take responsibility for the consequences [8].

Any implication of world government, international development project or transnational regulation system that repeats the colonial formations of foreign domination and subordination, even under the banner of human rights, eradication of poverty or global justice, is bound to cast darker clouds on the contemporary global justice debate [8]. Colonial history, in which the imposition of foreign domination and subordination was justified by Europeans by the civilizing missions, developmental need and perceived superiority of the European political and economic institutions points to such observations [22]. Even when presented in terms of human rights, poverty alleviation, or global justice, any proposal for a world government, international development project, or transnational regulatory framework that perpetuates colonial patterns of foreign dominance and subordination inevitably arouses suspicion among post-colonial states and peoples [23].

The self-determination issue of communitarianism cautions against excessively technocratic, top-down institutional design templates of world justice that lack democratic legitimacy in most societies and do not reflect the political traditions, institutional cultures and normative vocabularies of concerned communities, elaborate global taxation schemes, compelling supranational adjudicative bodies, or international regulatory organizations with sweeping jurisdiction over domestic policymaking [24]. Cosmopolitan theorists think about substantive goals world justice must attain, but communitarianism prompts inquiry about procedural questions which cosmopolitanism tends How are global institutional design decisions, resource allocation decisions or policy prioritization decisions made? By which normative vocabularies and conceptualities are claims to global justice articulated and decided [24]?

Communitarianism argues that justice is impossible outside the democratic authorship: only global institutions that are constructed or approved by processes that give the affected peoples a real voice, engage in the world as subjects, and bestow on them ultimate authority over the world, can be legitimate and can give rise to real duties of ordinary people [24]. This calls for global institutions to be created in a way that avoids weakening peoples' collective self-determination and turning them into passive objects of benevolent cosmopolitan administration, but it does not call for universal agreement on all of them [25].

This is particularly important for post-colonial countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean, which distrust some cosmopolitan initiatives because they use universalist discourse about global justice to maintain Northern economic and cultural dominance [25]. Many Global South states view structural adjustment programs imposed by international financial institutions that restrict state capacity to pursue industrial policies or protect local industries, condition development aid on human rights policies, and limit development through climate mitigation schemes as foreign intervention that denies sovereign rights to choose development paths rather than as enactment of global justice [26].

The integration of communitarian issues related to self-determination and democratic legitimacy can serve to design global institutions that are more sensitive to different political traditions, more accountable to affected populations and groups, and more able to achieve actual buy-in as opposed to mere acquiescence [27]. This could include multilevel governance systems that maintain significant decision-making at the national and local levels instead of centralizing in international institutions; participatory procedures that ensure meaningful representation for impacted communities, including civil society organizations, indigenous peoples, and marginalized groups in addition to state representatives; subsidiarity principles that ensure decisions are made as locally as possible while maintaining effectiveness, with authority decentralized upward only when it is truly necessary to address transboundary issues; and pluralistic normative frameworks that permit contextually varied interpretation and application of global principles instead of imposing standardized templates [27].

Communitarian critique thus rectifies cosmopolitan prejudice against the institutional monism and centralization, by reminding that global justice is not attained by institutions and processes that do not acknowledge legitimate diversity of political communities and their right to determine their own futures [28].

2. Cultural Pluralism and Localized Interpretation

The second important contribution of communitarianism is its focus on cultural pluralism and the necessity to have contextual interpretations of moral norms when applied to societies whose contexts vary widely [29]. Although the majority of communitarian theorists do admit that there are minimal universal moral constraints, namely that of genocide, slavery, torture, etc., they hold that there are substantive issues of distributive justice, social welfare, specification of rights, and institutional design, which cannot be addressed solely by abstract cosmopolitan theorizing, but which must be related to localized meanings, social practices, and historically situated understandings of goods and relationships [20].

A useful paradigm is offered by Michael Walzer's differentiation between thick and thin morality [20]. Walzer makes the case for thin universal morality, which is a minimal collection of moral principles that are recognized by most nations and traditions. These principles include the bans on systematic cruelty, enslavement, torture, and murder [20]. Because such acts violate widely shared, if not truly universal, constraints, outside parties may criticize and even intervene when communities commit genocide, engage in chattel slavery, or torture dissidents on a systematic basis. In extreme cases, this thin morality can serve as the foundation for cross-cultural moral criticism and intervention [20].

Outside the thin universal core, there is what Walzer calls thick morality, the rich, textured, contextually constructions of dignity, respect, fairness, solidarity, legitimate authority

and proper allocation of goods inherent in particular cultural traditions, to religious communities and political societies [20]. These thick moral understandings are legitimately incommensurable across societies and cannot be reduced or derived based on the thin universal core: what is the respectful treatment of others varies in communities; how healthcare, education or housing should be distributed may be dependent on whether societies view themselves as individualist or communitarian, as egalitarian or hierarchical, religious or secular; which goods are sacred or marketable differs across traditions [20].

Walzer would apply to global justice the point that, although cosmopolitans have the right to demand minimal standards of universal justice, protection against genocide, slavery, starvation, torture, etc., they should be more restraining in requiring more substantive standards of distributive justice, institutional design and social policy that reflect particular (commonly Western liberal) perceptions but are not necessarily universal needs [20]. It is necessary to interpret ideas such as equality of opportunity, sufficient Arian thresholds, basic necessities, and democratic governance. What constitutes basic requirements—bare survival or dignified existence? social engagement?), what ought to be made equal (market access? involvement in politics? cultural recognition?), and what kind of democracy—liberal parliamentary, deliberative, or consociationalism—are acceptable? religious democracy?) cannot be decided in a vacuum; rather, it must be decided collaboratively within the relevant societies based on their moral languages and self-perceptions [20].

This has a practical implication on the design and implementation of global justice initiatives. Consider several examples. In the development priorities, communitarian-sensitive approach would not dictate universal forms of development that stress the economic growth, industrialization and market integration, but can support participatory development, where different societies would define their own visions of development, whereas some societies could focus on economic prosperity, others on preserving culture, others on environmental sustainability or spiritual values [30]. While basic laws against violence, human trafficking, and systematic subordination should be universal, gender equality policies may take different forms depending on culture and religion. For example, the way family law is structured, reproductive freedom is protected, and care work is valued and distributed may admit differences that go beyond simply tolerating injustice [31]. It is impossible to draw this line from the outside; instead, one must interact with women's voices and struggles within their society in order to distinguish between true oppression that needs to be condemned and fought and cultural variation that has to be acknowledged [32].

With regards to land allocation and property rights, cosmopolitan principles of distributive justice usually assume western liberal conceptions of property rights of individuals, market distribution and state regulation. Nevertheless, numerous indigenous and traditional societies comprehend land in very different ways, as collective, spiritual or categorized by customary law regimes instead of state law [32]. Global justice systems that do not appreciate this diversity will run the risk of imposing alien property regime that fetters traditional practices and community unity [33].

On the climate justice and an emission quota, where the immediate response would be to tackle climate change, the detail of apportionment of the emissions entitlements and mitigation burdens, whether on historical accountable grounds or on per-capita equality or developmental need, would be controversial value judgments, which different communities can reasonably make differently [34]. A communitarian approach would focus on negotiated agreements of the different priorities, rather than using unilateral rational distribution formulas [34].

A communitarian sensitive world justice would consequently have been able to strike a balance between dogmatic universalism that imposes generalized patterns of operation regardless of context and credulous relativism that justifies systematized oppression in the name of cultural diversity [30]. This method seeks to strike a balance between naïve relativism, which supports systematized tyranny under the preteens of cultural diversity, and dogmatic universalism, which imposes uniform operating patterns regardless of context [35].

3. Motivational Realism and Feasibility

The third significant contribution of Communitarianism deals with the question of motivational realism and political feasibility: that moral commitments, though philosophically good, are most likely to be accepted, internalized and enforced, when they appeal to existing attachments identities and moral languages of people instead of having to ask them to give up some particularistic commitments to abstract universal humanity [35].

According to communitarians, the human moral psychology is structured by specific attachments and loyalties: family, friends, compatriots, co-religionists, neighbours [36]. The motivation to these special relationships is under certain conditions, and in some measure, morally suitable: the world would be poorer, not richer, where parents had no special duties to their children, citizens to fellow-citizens, or religious believers to co-religionists [36]. A world where parents had no special obligations to their children, citizens to one another, or religious believers to one another would be morally poorer, not richer, according to communitarians. Cosmopolitan theorists, on the other hand, frequently view this partiality as a barrier to be overcome or as being limited by impartial morality principles [36].

The practical lesson of global justice is that cosmopolitan calls to universal humanity, even as philosophically powerful, might not lead to much political good will to redistribution globally, international institutional reform or incur high domestic costs to help far-away strangers, when policy implications appear to run counter to self-community interests [37]. Moral philosophers may be persuaded by arguments that all people are equally valuable, that geographical distance is morally arbitrary, or that we are involved in unfair global institutions, but mass publics and political institutions will not agree with calls to double foreign aid, accept large numbers of refugees, or accept international treaties that restrict national sovereignty based only on impersonal moral imperatives [2].

Communitarian wisdom recommends that global justice advocates ought to tactically package the global responsibilities in ways that are appealing and build upon pre-existing specific attachments and moral identities of people as opposed to pressuring them to disidentify and transcend them [2]. This is a localization or vernacularisation

strategy, which advocates of global justice should attempt to package the global responsibilities in ways that are attractive and build on the already existing particular attachments and moral identities of people [36], as opposed to asking them to transcend and disidentify them.

Often appealing to narratives that these nations benefited from carbon-intensive development, contributed disproportionately to atmospheric carbon concentration through industrialization, and have a special obligation to assist vulnerable nations facing climate harms, historical responsibility narratives are especially successful in climate justice activism in Western nations [38]. Historical responsibility discourses are especially good in climate justice activism in the West, often appealing to the discourses of historical wrongdoing, reparation of historical injustices, and polluter pays ideologies [38].

In societies where religious identity is a concern, the religious view of global justice calls can be more motivationally effective than secular cosmopolitan calls of stewardship and care to the vulnerable and the solidarity of the ummah, Buddhist compassion, Hindu seva service [39]. There are many religious traditions that have resources rich to think about global justice responsibilities in religious terms [39].

Likewise, global justice activists can use national civic values in association with international duties: the traditions of the American immigration policy and the French republican universalism policy, the Scandinavian social democratic welfare and equality traditions or the Indian traditions of non-violence and hospitality can offer cultural-specific motivation sources to support global justice efforts lacking in abstract cosmopolitan argument [40].

This approach of communitarian localization does not entail any renunciation of cosmopolitan commitments to universal human dignity and equal moral worth, but acknowledges that in order to achieve success in mobilizing political backing of global justice, there must be an attempt to translate the abstract principles of universalism connected to these moral commitments into the moral identities and community of loyalty that people already have [35]. The difficulty lies in carrying out this translation task without compromising the universalistic essence of cosmopolitan commitments or permitting particularistic allegiances to triumph over sincere connections to faraway people [35].

Communitarian restrictions to global justice

Although communitarianism has much to say, it suffers from severe shortcomings that do not allow it to offer sufficient frameworks to global justice on its own [11]: it is hard to explain obligations to strangers at a distance, who are harmed by transnational structures, it is prone to cultural relativism in Favor of universal human rights, and it tends to political conservatism that protects current distributions [11].

1. The transnational structural injustice Problem

The greatest weakness of communitarianism consists in the inability to recognize the existence of moral obligations or duties to far-off others who suffer due to our engagement in unjust institutional arrangements [5]. It is as though the moral obligations are produced mainly by belonging to communities and having constitutive relations: what about those of us who do not reside in our communities but are nonetheless harmed by our institutions and actions [5]?

Institutional cosmopolitanism by Thomas Pogge explicitly disputes communitarian models by showing that global economic order, in terms of trade regimes, intellectual property regimes, resource privileges, lending patterns, etc. all are systematic in disadvantaging globally the poor but benefiting rich countries and individuals, collectively by way of moral choice [5]. These arrangements are not organic; rather, they are the result of political decisions made by the inhabitants of prosperous democracies [5]. Because it invokes generally accepted obligations not to harm rather than contested positive duties to assist, Pogge's negative duty framework—which emphasizes that we harm distant others by imposing institutions that predictably cause their deprivation—proves particularly difficult for communitarianism to reject [5].

Communitarianism has trouble explaining why communitarian democratic citizens need to be concerned with the distributive implications of these arrangements beyond their borders in the event that our main duties run to co-citizens [37]. In case the level of interdependence on a global basis is very high nowadays, and most of the economic, environmental and security issues are irrevocably transnational, how can we fault international institutional arrangements that advantage our own communities, but disadvantage others [37]? Given the current levels of global interdependence, when almost no society exists in isolation and the majority of economic, environmental, and security issues are inherently transnational, this constraint proves particularly problematic [9].

2. Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights

The moral particularism and cultural pluralism that come with communitarianism threatens to sink into the issue of problematic cultural relativism that fails to offer adequate protection of universal human rights [20]. What justification is there for condemning practices such as female genital mutilation, child marriage, caste-based discrimination, or the denial of religious freedom as valid parts of a community's traditions if justice principles are always community-specific interpretations of local shared meanings [41]?

Although Walzer tries if his by his thin universal morality, minimum prohibitions against killing, enslavement, torture, it is clear that the distinction between unacceptable breach of thin universal prohibitions and justified thick cultural variations is also debatable and hard to draw in a consistent manner [20]. Walzer, critics observe, tries to use his thin universal morality, but the fact remains that it is too minimalistic to actually offer substantial protection of human rights and leaves the way to systematic gender subordination, denial of democratic rights, and economic exploitation as long as they do not amount to genocide, slavery or mass starvation [42].

Further, communitarianism highlights the importance of holding onto shared meaning and self-determination tends to Favor the views of those members of the community who hold a powerful position over the views of marginalized groups with alternative interpretations of shared meaning, which may serve as a way of enforcing the status quo of power imbalances under the guise of culture [41]. Communitarianism lacks a justification for women, lower castes, religious minorities, or other marginalized groups to oppose established communal authority when they question prevailing interpretations of their community's common understandings [41]. In reality, calls to accept communities' self-interpretation are frequently used to quell internal

dissension and safeguard the interests of influential organizations [41].

3. Conservative Prejudice and Protection of the status quo

The interpretive methodology of communitarianism, which focuses on articulating the current shared understandings of communities, is inclined to political conservatism that defends current distribution patterns and is hostile to transformative justice claims [8]. To the extent justice demands devotion to the implicit self-understandings of communities, how does one justify radical redistribution when such redistribution is counter-thetical to current distributions of understanding [8]? Communitarian justice theory is prone to being simply descriptive sociology of the current shared understandings instead of radical normative theory able to challenge unjust but widely accepted practices [11].

This conservative orientation is particularly objectionable to global justice when we consider the fact that existing societies self-conceive themselves as having few or no duties to strangers in other parts of the world even as they feel entitled to preexisting global orders which are helpful to them [5]. Assuming that the current communities self-conceptions would be our benchmark, we will perceive the situation of wealthy nations as having few or no obligations to strangers elsewhere in the world and themselves as enjoying the benefits of existing global orders [37]. Communitarianism finds it difficult to produce significant leverage in opposition to these self-serving interpretations [37].

Toward Hybrid frameworks: Incorporating Insights

Since cosmopolitanism and communitarianism have their distinct advantages and limitations, the most promising way forward is hybrid frameworks that combine cosmopolitanism matters of universal moral equality with communitarian understandings of democratic legitimacy, cultural pluralism and motivational psychology [36]. Two such ways of hybridism are rooted cosmopolitanism and social connection models of responsibility [36].

1. Rooted Cosmopolitanism

An example of rooted cosmopolitanism is cosmopolitan patriotism by Kwame Anthony Appiah, who contends that cosmopolitan moral commitments need not be based on the rejection of particular attachments to the family, community, or nation but can be built upon such relationships [43]. Appiah is in Favor of the former and opposed to the latter approach to cosmopolitanism, arguing that it is merely a bare recognition of universal human dignity and basic rights, to be built upon preexisting particularistic attachments to family, community, cultural community [43]. He opposes thick cosmopolitanism and supports thin cosmopolitanism, contending that some ties—to family, country, and cultural community—are not barriers to cosmopolitan ethics but rather serve as a foundation for cosmopolitan sympathies [43].

The rooted cosmopolitan approach holds that we are taught to care about other distant people not despite our specific attachment but through it: caring about our own children will teach us something about why all children should learn to be offered protection; loyalty to our own nation will help us learn to appreciate the legitimate patriotic attachment of others; involvement in our own cultural community will train us to know how to acknowledge and respect cultural diversity [43]. Both the pure communitarian acceptance of whatever commitments our communities happen to acknowledge and the pure cosmopolitan demands to transcend all particularistic affiliations are avoided in this approach [43].

The practical implications of the rooted cosmopolitanism are identified as: global justice institutions ought to act with, and not against, the specific loyalties of people; special relationships do allow partiality, but within universal restraints; global obligations ought to be packaged in ways that appeal to the already existing moral identities, and that multilevel structures of governance should be able to accommodate both particular and universal ties [43].

2. Social Connection Models of Responsibility

Another intermediate between purely voluntaristic contractual ethical obligations on the one hand and the deterministic structural causation [44] on the other is the social connection model of responsibility developed by Iris Marion Young: people become responsible not because they themselves caused injustice to anyone but because they are positioned in institutional structures that systematically generate injustice [44]. This duty is different from guilt or culpability since it stems from our participation in and benefit from institutional arrangements that consistently result in unfair outcomes, not from any personal rights violations [44].

The model of responsibility created by Young produces universal, but differentiated, responsibilities [44]. Responsibilities are universal because everyone who is a part of any unjust structure has a responsibility of some kind in that structure; they are differentiated in that the extent of responsibility varies according to the power, privilege, interest and collective capacity of the person in that structure [44]; and lastly, responsibilities are proportionately greater to those who are in a better position to achieve structural change [44].

This strategy eschews abstraction of cosmopolitanism at the expense of specific power practices, and communitarianism at the expense of specific social standpoints; and it is not bound by either one of these to its obligations [44]. It stays clear of both communitarian limitations on duties to fellow members and cosmopolitan disengagement from actual power dynamics and social positions [44].

The social connection model has a practical implication to global justice in that the citizens of wealthy countries have a responsibility not as abstract universal duties but as placed participants in the global economic, political and environmental systems that are systematic in benefiting them and harming others [44]. This responsibility is prospective and not retrospective and is therefore concerned with transforming unjust structures as opposed to imposing blame on past misfortunes [44].

Conclusion

The cosmopolitanism-communitarianism debate is not just an academic controversy, but it contains real conflicts in international justice theory and practice concerning the correct extent of justice, can moral obligation be based and on what grounds, and on what institutions should justice be sought. Both approaches do not offer sufficient frameworks to deal with modern global issues.

Cosmopolitanism that lacks communitarian understandings is prone to several failures. First, moral imperialism by the means of imposing specific cultural understanding as universal demands. Second, democratic illegitimacy by establishing world institutions that workaround or even override the collective self-determination of peoples. Third, motivational breakdowns due to framing world responsibilities in abstract fashion that does not resonate with real-life moral identities and commitments of people. These failures do not only contravene significant values but also limit the practical efficacy of cosmopolitan projects.

On the contrary, communitarianism that lacks cosmopolitan obligations runs the risk of failing. To start with, parochialism, by not appreciating or respecting responsibilities to strangers distant in our institutional decisions, was detrimental. Second, cultural relativism in the form of inadequate protection of universal human rights, whereby there is systematic oppression in the pretext of cultural diversity. Third, the callousness towards suffering in a remote location by granting moral priority to the interests of co-members only. Such failures present communitarianism with the inabilities to solve urgent transnational justice problems in an interdependent global environment.

The way ahead entails hybrid structures of cosmopolitan acknowledgment of common human dignity and communitarian focus on democratic validity, cultural pluralism and inspirational realism. These frameworks must work with several working strategies. First, there are multilevel spaces of governance that preserve significant local and national self-determination but also introduce international institutions to overcome transboundary injustices that cannot be solved locally independently. Second, giving cultural pluralism the due respect without compromising non-negotiable universal human rights guarantees that must be negotiated on an ongoing basis regarding where permissible cultural difference starts and where rights violations occur. Third, making global commitments in a manner that would resonate with their pre-existing moral identities and specific attachments and at the same time problematize parochial apathy to suffering in other parts of the world.

These mixed methods recognize that both general and specific are valid in complete justice theories. Basic rights, and equal moral worth are non-negotiable prerequisites to universal commitments on human dignity. Specific bonding to family, community, nation and culture are beneficial aspect of human thriving and not hindrances that should be overcome. The problem lies in building institutions and practices capable of upholding each of the two aspects, i.e. that safeguard the universal rights without contravening the cultural diversity, that allow the global cooperation without undermining the local self-determination, that consider the universal obligations but the motivating power of the loyalties.

What global justice does not demand are either pure cosmopolitan universalism or pure communitarian particularism, but instead constant dialogue across this chasm, building principles and institutions that respect both universal human dignity and legitimate communal diversity in an interdependent world where our institutional decisions inevitably impact upon distant strangers but our greatest loyalties and action capacities are all linked to specific communities. This dialectical method acknowledges that instead of solution to either cosmopolitan or communitarian, the cosmopolitan-communitarian tension needs to be continuously negotiated by the practices of mutual engagement, critical reflection, and institutional experimentation which respect the equal importance of universal moral equality alongside the constitutive importance of communities.

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