



Contract enforcement and foreign direct investment in Nigeria: A critical review of legal predictability and investor confidence

Akinsola O K¹, Agboke M O²

¹ Senior Lecturer, College of Law, Chrisland University, Abeokuta, Nigeria

² Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Fountain University, Osogbo, Nigeria

Abstract

This paper critically examines the relationship between contract enforcement and foreign direct investment (FDI) in Nigeria, highlighting the legal, institutional, and economic factors that shape investor behaviour. Employing a structured review methodology, the study synthesises evidence from peer-reviewed literature, policy analyses, and legal scholarship to identify trends, challenges, and gaps in Nigeria's commercial legal environment. The review integrates theoretical perspectives from Transaction Cost Economics, Institutional Theory, and Property Rights Theory to explain how judicial efficiency, procedural consistency, and enforceable property rights influence FDI inflows. Findings indicate that delays, inconsistencies, and weak enforcement of foreign-jurisdiction clauses continue to constrain investment, while reforms and alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms offer pathways to improve investor confidence. The paper concludes by outlining policy implications, managerial strategies, and directions for future empirical research, emphasising that predictable contract enforcement is a critical determinant of Nigeria's attractiveness as an investment destination.

Keywords: Contract enforcement, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Nigeria, judicial efficiency, institutional quality

Introduction

Contract enforcement continues to shape the quality and stability of Nigeria's investment climate, particularly for foreign investors who rely heavily on predictable legal outcomes to minimise risk. Although Nigeria remains one of Africa's most strategically positioned markets, concerns about judicial delays, procedural uncertainty, and inconsistent regulatory behaviour still influence investor sentiment (Ninyio 2024) [29]. Scholars examining Nigeria's broader investment environment argue that the legal system does not consistently guarantee swift adjudication, effective recognition of foreign judgments, or efficient dispute-resolution mechanisms, all of which are central to foreign direct investment decisions (Ekhaton and Anyiwe 2016; Adejugbe 2013) [1, 18].

The implications of legal uncertainty are evident in the steady focus on Bilateral Investment Treaties and other instruments designed to reassure foreign firms that their contractual rights will be upheld (Akinola 2024) [5]. Yet, empirical studies suggest that these frameworks are undermined by bottlenecks within domestic courts, limited enforcement capacity, and policy inconsistencies that weaken Nigeria's attractiveness to multinational enterprises (Agbede *et al.* 2025, Osuma *et al.* 2024) [2, 30]. The situation is further complicated by the frequency of investor-state disputes and the mixed effectiveness of both local courts and arbitration centres, resulting in unpredictable timelines and increased transaction costs.

Recent scholarship also points to the growing relevance of jurisdictional clauses and the treatment of foreign judgments, which remain areas of contentious legal interpretation in Nigeria. For example, Yekini (2023) [43] demonstrates that foreign jurisdiction clauses are not consistently enforced in accordance with commercial expectations, which creates a perception of legal risk among international commercial actors. Similarly, Amucheazi, Nwankwo, and Nwodo (2024) [9] highlight substantial

procedural hurdles in enforcing foreign judgments, noting that delays and outdated statutes diminish investors' confidence in judicial outcomes.

Overall, the evidence suggests that while Nigeria has made commitments to improve contract enforcement and enhance investor protection, the practical realities within its legal institutions continue to shape FDI inflows in significant ways. This review brings these strands of scholarship together, synthesising the legal, institutional, and empirical dimensions of contract enforcement and foreign investment, to identify the core challenges and opportunities for reform.

Conceptual Clarifications

A clear understanding of the core concepts, particularly contract enforcement and foreign direct investment, is essential before examining their relationship within the Nigerian context. Contract enforcement refers to the institutional and procedural mechanisms through which parties ensure that agreements are honoured and that breaches attract predictable remedies. In functional legal systems, contract enforcement requires efficiency, transparency, judicial competence, and clear procedural rules. Where these attributes are weak or inconsistent, the commercial environment becomes less predictable and transaction costs rise, a pattern frequently noted in assessments of Nigeria's legal landscape (Ekhaton and Anyiwe 2016, Adejugbe 2013) [1, 18].

Foreign direct investment (FDI) involves cross-border capital inflows in which an investor acquires a lasting interest and a significant degree of influence over the management of a business entity in another country. Nigeria continues to attract varying levels of FDI due to its large market size, natural resources, and regional influence, although investors routinely weigh these advantages against regulatory uncertainty and legal risks (Ninyio 2024; Osuma *et al.* 2024) [29, 30]. Scholars in this domain emphasise that FDI inflows are shaped by structural economic factors such

as exchange-rate stability, political risk, and ease of doing business (Victoria and Opuala-Charles 2023) [38]. However, institutional and legal determinants, particularly the reliability of contract enforcement mechanisms, remain equally influential.

Contract enforcement in Nigeria is embedded within a broader legal framework that includes domestic legislation, judicial practice, arbitration norms, and internationally binding commitments such as Bilateral Investment Treaties. These treaties often provide guarantees on expropriation, dispute resolution, and fair treatment, intended to reinforce investor protection beyond domestic statutes (Akinola 2024, Agbede *et al.* 2025) [2, 5]. Yet the effectiveness of these instruments depends heavily on the performance of local courts and on regulatory agencies' capacity to administer commercial justice consistently.

Another relevant concept is the enforcement of foreign jurisdiction clauses and foreign judgments, both of which determine how international commercial relationships operate in practice. Nigeria's treatment of these instruments remains a recurring concern, with studies indicating that inconsistent judicial interpretation and outdated legislation often hinder the efficient recognition and enforcement of these instruments (Yekini 2023; Amucheazi *et al.* 2024) [9, 43]. These issues feed directly into broader perceptions of Nigeria's investment climate and shape how foreign firms assess long-term commercial risk.

Taken together, these concepts demonstrate that contract enforcement is not merely a legal technicality but a fundamental determinant of economic behaviour. In contexts where investors perceive enforcement to be uncertain or slow, capital inflows tend to weaken, dispute resolution becomes costlier, and the incentives for long-term investment diminish. This conceptual foundation sets the stage for a deeper review of how these dynamics unfold in Nigeria's evolving investment environment.

Theoretical Perspectives

The relationship between contract enforcement and foreign direct investment in Nigeria can be better understood through a set of interrelated theoretical lenses. Transaction Cost Economics, Institutional Theory, and Property Rights Theory each offer explanatory value, and the broader literature on legal institutions and investment behaviour helps contextualise how these mechanisms influence investor decisions in practice.

1. Transaction Cost Economics (TCE)

Transaction Cost Economics provides a compelling foundation for examining why investors place such high value on predictable contract enforcement. At its core, TCE argues that economic actors seek to minimise the costs associated with negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing agreements. When legal systems operate slowly or inconsistently, these costs rise sharply, increasing the likelihood of contractual disputes and opportunistic behaviour. Studies across different contexts show that actors respond to high transaction costs by adopting governance structures that minimise exposure to uncertainty or by reducing their level of engagement entirely (Chou and Ramser 2021, Verbeke and Kano 2012) [14, 37].

Evidence from financial services and supply chains reinforces the argument that inefficient enforcement environments discourage complex or long-term investments.

For example, research on payment systems, supply chain efficiency, and digital integration highlights how weak institutional support amplifies transaction costs and reshapes decision-making behaviour (Hoang and Vu 2020, Ketokivi and Mahoney 2020, Patil *et al.* 2023) [23, 24, 31]. Similar patterns appear in agricultural, cooperative, and cross-border markets, where higher transaction costs reduce participation and limit competitive behaviour (Yao *et al.* 2022, de Souza Meirelles *et al.* 2023, Stevenson *et al.* 2023, Tomašević *et al.* 2023, Trejo-Pech *et al.* 2023) [17, 33, 35, 36, 42]. Within the Nigerian context, this theoretical perspective implies that delays in contract enforcement, unpredictable judgments, and inconsistent regulatory practices directly raise the cost of doing business. Foreign investors are therefore likely to proceed cautiously or avoid long-term commitments when institutional conditions signal elevated enforcement risk.

2. Institutional Theory

Institutional Theory emphasises the role of formal and informal rules, norms, and cultural expectations in shaping organisational behaviour. In investment environments, the robustness of legal institutions signals reliability, fairness, and predictability, which are essential for foreign investment. Contemporary extensions of institutional theory underscore how changing institutional arrangements influence compliance, governance behaviour, and organisational adaptation (Coates *et al.* 2023, Aksom and Vakulenko 2023) [6, 16].

Empirical research shows that institutional pressures, regulatory environments, and administrative logics affect managerial decision-making and investor confidence (Ahrens *et al.* 2023) [4]. Cross-country evidence demonstrates that institutional environments shape innovation adoption, sustainability transitions, and corporate practices in significant ways, further underscoring the importance of legal certainty for investment climates (Guarnieri *et al.* 2023) [22]. Similarly, organisational control systems and governance structures tend to evolve in response to institutional expectations, suggesting that firms operating in weak enforcement environments may adopt defensive or short-term strategies (Barros and Ferreira 2023) [11].

In Nigeria, institutional inconsistencies, policy reversals, and judicial bottlenecks collectively shape investor expectations. Institutional Theory, therefore, helps explain why foreign firms often rely on arbitration clauses, BITs, or offshore jurisdiction agreements to compensate for perceived institutional weaknesses.

3. Property Rights Theory

Property Rights Theory argues that well-defined, secure, and enforceable rights create the foundation for investment, innovation, and entrepreneurship. Weak or ambiguous property rights increase uncertainty, reduce incentives for long-term capital commitments, and undermine economic performance. Modern interpretations of the theory expand its relevance to corporate governance, innovation ecosystems, and resource management (Aoki and Sawai 2024, Maskus 2022, Siltaloppi and Ballardini 2023) [10, 28, 32]. The theory further highlights how transaction costs and property rights interact to influence strategic decisions and firm boundaries (Foss and Foss 2022, Khalil 2024, Swanson *et al.* 1992) [20, 25, 34]. Empirical studies across sectors such as

fisheries, rural land reform, and corporate scope of operations reveal that secure property rights enhance productivity, reduce disputes, and stimulate investment (Alsaleh *et al.* 2024, Li *et al.* 2025, Xiang *et al.* 2024) [8, 26, 40].

Applied to Nigeria, Property Rights Theory suggests that foreign investors remain sensitive to the extent to which contracts, licences, concessions, and investment agreements receive consistent judicial protection. Where property rights are uncertain, investors discount future returns and either demand additional guarantees or divert capital elsewhere.

4. Linking Legal Institutions and Investment Behaviour

A broader stream of research links legal systems, governance structures, and public policy frameworks directly to investment patterns. Studies indicate that corruption, political interference, and governance weaknesses distort investment outcomes and discourage long-term capital inflows (Xu *et al.* 2025, Bolomope *et al.* 2021) [12, 41]. Legal systems also shape sector-specific investment behaviour, particularly in renewable energy, green technology, and regulated industries, where predictable rules are crucial for high-risk capital commitments (Liu *et al.* 2021, Cheng *et al.* 2022) [13, 27].

Investor behaviour is also shaped by cognitive, institutional, and behavioural expectations, with evidence showing that legal uncertainty influences risk appetite during economic shocks or institutional transitions (Cicchello and Kazemikhasragh 2022, Wang *et al.* 2022) [15, 39]. Other studies highlight how legal and institutional barriers affect the adoption of technologies, investment in innovation, and the scaling of environmental or infrastructural projects (Zheng *et al.* 2021, Frantzi *et al.* 2021, Alosaimi and Alfraih 2023) [7, 21, 44].

For Nigeria, these insights reinforce the argument that predictable contract enforcement forms part of a broader governance ecosystem. Investors assess not only the formal laws but also the behaviour of courts, regulators, and political actors. When legal institutions operate inconsistently or inefficiently, investment patterns become cautious, risk premiums rise, and capital inflows may weaken.

Taken together, these theoretical perspectives highlight a simple but powerful principle: foreign investment thrives where contract enforcement is predictable, efficient, and institutionally supported. Transaction Cost Economics emphasises cost minimisation, Institutional Theory emphasises the legitimacy and stability of legal structures, and Property Rights Theory emphasises clarity and security. When viewed alongside the empirical research on legal–investment linkages, these frameworks provide a robust theoretical foundation for understanding how Nigeria’s contract enforcement environment shapes its overall attractiveness to foreign investors.

Method of the Review

The review followed a structured search and screening process intended to capture the legal and institutional dimensions of contract enforcement and foreign direct investment in Nigeria. Peer-reviewed publications, legal analyses, and policy documents produced between 2010 and 2025 were sourced from Scopus, Web of Science, HeinOnline, JSTOR, and Google Scholar. The search

strategy relied on Boolean combinations of terms linked to contract enforcement, investor protection, commercial law, and FDI in Nigeria. Only studies that engaged directly with the interaction between legal institutions and investment behaviour were retained. Research focused exclusively on macroeconomic determinants of FDI, without consideration for institutional frameworks, was excluded to maintain conceptual alignment. Grey literature, such as government reports and judicial performance assessments, was included only when it provided contextual clarity unavailable in academic sources.

The screening process unfolded in three stages, involving initial title and abstract review, full-text assessment, and thematic coding. Coding was guided by recurring constructs in the literature, including judicial efficiency, procedural clarity, dispute-resolution systems, regulatory consistency, and perceptions of legal risk among foreign investors. Studies with divergent or conflicting conclusions were deliberately preserved to avoid selective interpretation and to expose areas of conceptual tension. Evidence was synthesised through thematic integration rather than statistical aggregation, which aligns with the legal and institutional nature of the topic. This approach ensures that the review maintains analytical coherence while remaining sensitive to the fragmented and evolving nature of Nigeria’s commercial legal environment.

Synthesis of Empirical Evidence

Trends in Contract Enforcement in Nigeria

Empirical studies indicate that Nigeria has made some progress in formalising commercial law and strengthening judicial procedures; however, challenges persist regarding efficiency, transparency, and predictability. Court delays, procedural bottlenecks, and inconsistent application of laws remain persistent obstacles, reducing confidence among foreign investors (Ekhaton and Anyiwe 2016, Adejugbe 2013) [1, 18]. Research also highlights that mechanisms such as arbitration and alternative dispute resolution have been underutilised, limiting their potential to offset weaknesses in traditional courts (Akinola 2024, Amucheazi *et al.* 2024) [5, 9]. Despite regulatory reforms and the establishment of investment protection instruments, the implementation gap continues to affect the overall reliability of contract enforcement in Nigeria (Agbede *et al.* 2025) [2].

Empirical Findings on Contract Enforcement and FDI in Developing Markets

Evidence from Nigeria and other developing economies demonstrates a strong link between the quality of contract enforcement and foreign direct investment inflows. Poor judicial performance, lack of enforcement of foreign jurisdiction clauses, and legal uncertainty directly influence investor risk perceptions, leading to cautious investment behaviour or selective engagement (Yekini 2023, Osuma *et al.* 2024) [30, 43]. Studies suggest that even where legal frameworks exist, inconsistencies in enforcement significantly raise transaction costs, aligning with broader Transaction Cost Economics perspectives on investment decision-making (Agwu 2019, Ninyio 2024) [3, 29]. These patterns indicate that the mere presence of laws or treaties is insufficient; their operational effectiveness is critical for sustaining FDI.

Comparative Insights from Other Emerging Economies

Comparative analyses reveal that countries with similar development profiles, such as other sub-Saharan African states, face analogous challenges in aligning legal structures with investment incentives. For instance, the effectiveness of bilateral investment treaties in mitigating enforcement risk varies significantly depending on domestic judicial efficiency and regulatory predictability (Akinola 2024, Victoria and Opuala-Charles 2023) ^[5, 38]. Empirical evidence from these contexts suggests that even minor institutional inefficiencies can disproportionately affect investor confidence, emphasizing the importance of both formal legal provisions and their practical application. Lessons from these economies highlight the potential of procedural reforms and streamlined enforcement to influence FDI inflows positively.

Gaps and Inconsistencies in the Evidence

Despite the growing body of literature, several gaps remain. First, much of the research focuses on broad legal and regulatory frameworks, with limited granular analysis of sector-specific enforcement outcomes or investor experiences (Adejogbe 2013, Agbede *et al.* 2025) ^[1, 2]. Second, empirical evidence on the effectiveness of foreign jurisdiction clauses and arbitration in reducing enforcement risk remains fragmented and occasionally contradictory (Yekini 2023, Amucheazi *et al.* 2024) ^[9, 43]. Finally, while macroeconomic and political variables are often included in FDI studies, few explicitly integrate judicial efficiency, legal transparency, and contract enforcement as core determinants, leaving an essential analytical gap for future research.

Policy and Managerial Implications

Strengthening Judicial Efficiency

Enhancing the efficiency of Nigeria's judicial system is a critical policy priority to improve investor confidence. Empirical evidence indicates that delays, procedural backlogs, and inconsistencies in adjudication remain major deterrents to foreign direct investment (Ekhatior and Anyiwe 2016; Adejogbe 2013) ^[1, 18]. Policy interventions could include judicial capacity-building, specialised commercial courts, and the digitisation of case management systems to ensure more timely and consistent decisions (Akinola 2024; Amucheazi *et al.* 2024) ^[5, 9]. Strengthened judicial efficiency would not only reduce uncertainty for investors but also enhance the credibility of Nigeria's legal framework as a foundation for long-term economic growth.

Reducing Enforcement Delays

Reducing the time required to enforce contracts is equally essential. Studies indicate that protracted enforcement processes in Nigeria increase transaction costs and create unpredictability for foreign investors (Agbede *et al.* 2025, Yekini 2023) ^[2, 43]. Streamlining procedures for both domestic and foreign judgments, expanding the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, and enforcing strict timelines could mitigate these delays. Such reforms would align legal practice with international investors' expectations and demonstrate Nigeria's commitment to predictable commercial governance (Osuma *et al.* 2024; Victoria and Opuala-Charles 2023) ^[30, 38].

Implications for Multinational Corporations

For multinational corporations, effective contract enforcement directly affects strategic decisions regarding market entry, investment scale, and risk management. Where judicial inefficiency or inconsistent enforcement persists, firms are likely to adopt conservative strategies, demand additional contractual safeguards, or divert investment to alternative markets (Agwu 2019, Ninyio 2024) ^[3, 29]. Conversely, predictable and efficient enforcement mechanisms enhance Nigeria's attractiveness as an investment destination, reduce perceived risk premiums, and encourage long-term capital commitments. Therefore, corporate managers and legal advisors must closely monitor judicial reforms, regulatory changes, and institutional performance to optimise investment decisions.

Research Gaps and Future Directions

Underexplored Variables

Despite the growing body of scholarship on contract enforcement and foreign direct investment in Nigeria, several key variables remain underexamined. For instance, sector-specific judicial performance, the role of informal dispute-resolution mechanisms, and the interaction between regulatory predictability and investor negotiation strategies have received limited empirical attention (Agbede *et al.* 2025, Adejogbe 2013) ^[1, 2]. Additionally, studies rarely examine how foreign jurisdiction clauses, arbitration effectiveness, and investor perceptions of institutional credibility interact with macroeconomic and political factors to influence FDI decisions (Yekini 2023; Amucheazi *et al.* 2024) ^[9, 43]. Addressing these gaps would provide a more nuanced understanding of the determinants of foreign investment in Nigeria.

Methodological Weaknesses

Methodological limitations are also evident in the existing literature. Many studies rely on secondary data or descriptive analyses, with insufficient use of longitudinal designs, mixed-methods approaches, or rigorous econometric modelling to capture causal relationships between contract enforcement and FDI inflows (Ekhatior and Anyiwe 2016, Ninyio 2024) ^[18, 29]. Furthermore, few studies integrate investor-level data or case-based analyses, which could offer more granular insights into how perceived enforcement risk shapes investment behaviour (Osuma *et al.* 2024, Agwu 2019) ^[3, 30]. Strengthening methodological rigour is therefore essential for producing reliable evidence that can guide policy and corporate decision-making.

Directions for Future Empirical Work

Future research should prioritise integrating institutional, legal, and economic variables to develop comprehensive models of FDI determinants. Comparative studies with other emerging economies could help contextualise Nigeria's legal challenges and identify best practices for reform (Victoria and Opuala-Charles 2023, Akinola 2024) ^[5, 38]. Empirical work could also focus on evaluating the effectiveness of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, monitoring judicial reforms, and assessing the impact of contract enforcement on sector-specific investment outcomes. Mixed-method designs combining quantitative investment data with qualitative stakeholder interviews would provide richer insights into the mechanisms through which legal institutions influence investor behaviour.

Conclusion

This review demonstrates that contract enforcement remains a critical determinant of foreign direct investment in Nigeria. Conceptually, reliable and transparent enforcement mechanisms reduce transaction costs, enhance legal predictability, and provide the institutional stability necessary for long-term investment decisions. Theoretical perspectives, including Transaction Cost Economics, Institutional Theory, and Property Rights Theory, collectively explain why investors are sensitive to the efficiency, consistency, and credibility of Nigeria's legal institutions. Empirical evidence reinforces these insights, showing that judicial delays, procedural inconsistencies, and weak enforcement of foreign jurisdiction clauses continue to undermine investor confidence and constrain FDI inflows.

The analysis also highlights areas for reform and scholarly attention. Strengthening judicial efficiency, reducing enforcement delays, and integrating alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are essential policy priorities. For multinational corporations, awareness of these institutional dynamics informs risk management and strategic planning, shaping investment patterns and long-term commitments. Finally, research gaps remain regarding underexplored variables, methodological limitations, and the need for sector-specific and comparative studies. Addressing these gaps will not only advance academic understanding but also support evidence-based policy interventions to improve Nigeria's investment climate. Overall, predictable and effective contract enforcement emerges as a cornerstone for fostering a robust, investor-friendly environment, reinforcing the centrality of law and institutions in shaping economic outcomes.

References

1. Adejugbe A. Foreign Direct Investment in Nigeria: Overcoming Legal and Regulatory Challenges to Foreign Direct Investments in Nigeria: Is the Nigerian Government Doing Enough? SSRN Electronic Journal, 2013. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2354319>
2. Agbede F, Agbede O. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Company Regulation in Nigeria: Legal Incentives and Barriers. Papers.ssrn.com, 2025. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5223378
3. Agwu E. Foreign Direct Investment: A review from the Nigerian Perspective. Research Journal of Business and Management, 2019;1(3):318–337. <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/269632671>
4. Ahrens T, Ferry L, Khalifa R. The critical potential of institutional theory revisited — a field study of the rationalisation of budget fairness through agentic actorhood. Qualitative Research in Accounting and Management, 2023;20(5):593–620. <https://doi.org/10.1108/QRAM-08-2021-0149>
5. Akinola A. Analyzing the Legal Framework of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Nigeria: Understanding Regulatory Structures, Resolving Disputes, and Evaluating Economic Effects. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2024. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4687514>
6. Aksom H, Vakulenko V. Revisiting the scope and suggesting novel domains of institutional theory in public administration research. Teaching Public Administration, 2023. <https://doi.org/10.1177/01447394231191935>
7. Alosaimi AK, Alfraih MM. Investment strategies of sovereign wealth funds: the potential and challenges of empirical research. Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 2023;31(4):445–468. <https://doi.org/10.1108/JFRC-09-2022-0115>
8. Alsaleh M, Abdul-Rahim AS, Liu R, Sun Q. Nature of property rights and motivation for blue growth: An empirical evidence from the fisheries industry. Natural Resources Forum, 2024;48(1):184–210. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1477-8947.12317>
9. Amucheazi C, Nwankwo CM, Nwodo F. A reassessment of the challenges of enforcement of foreign judgments in Nigeria: the need for legislative reform to ease business. Journal of Private International Law, 2024;20(2):473–499. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17441048.2024.2377407>
10. Aoki Y, Sawai K. An Economic Analysis of Consolidation Accounting: The Property Rights Approach. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2024. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4757576>
11. Barros RS, Ferreira AMDSC. Management control systems and innovation: a case study grounded in institutional theory. Journal of Management Control, 2023;34(1):109–133. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00187-023-00351-4>
12. Bolomope M, Amidu AR, Filippova O, Levy D. Property investment decision-making behaviour amidst market disruptions: an institutional perspective. Property Management, 2021;39(1):1–21. <https://doi.org/10.1108/PM-06-2020-0042>
13. Cheng B, Qiu B, Chan KC, Zhang H. Does a green tax impact a heavy-polluting firm's green investment? Applied Economics, 2022;54(2):189–205. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2021.1963663>
14. Chou SY, Ramser C. Understanding the costs of interpersonal helping and governing mechanisms: an application of transaction cost economics theory. Journal of Economic and Administrative Sciences, 2021. <https://doi.org/10.1108/jeas-03-2020-0034>
15. Cicchiello AFF, Kazemikhasragh A. Tackling gender bias in equity crowdfunding: an exploratory study of investment behaviour of Latin American investors. European Business Review, 2022;34(3):370–395. <https://doi.org/10.1108/EBR-08-2021-0187>
16. Coates SK, Trudgett M, Page S. Indigenous institutional theory: a new theoretical framework and methodological tool. Australian Educational Researcher, 2023;50(3):903–920. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13384-022-00533-4>
17. de Souza Meirelles F, de Moura Engracia Giraldo J, de Campos RP. Transaction costs, economics, and geographical indications: a systematic analysis of the literature. Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural, 2023, 61(4). <https://doi.org/10.1590/18069479.2022.264494>
18. Ekhatior EO, Anyiwe L. Foreign direct investment and the law in Nigeria: a legal assessment. International Journal of Law and Management, 2016;58(1):126–146. <https://doi.org/10.1108/IJLMA-08-2014-0049>
19. Eniekezimene AF, Wodu E, Anda-Owei JP. Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth in Nigeria: A Revisit. Asian Journal of Probability and

- Statistics,2024;26(2):37–48.
<https://doi.org/10.9734/ajpas/2024/v26i2590>
20. Foss K, Foss NJ. Property Rights, Transaction Costs, and Entrepreneurship. *Economic Microfoundations of Strategic Management*, 2022, 215–250.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12910-0_9
 21. Frantzi S, Brouwer R, Watkins E, van Beukering P, Cunha MC, Dijkstra H, *et al.* Adoption and diffusion of marine litter clean-up technologies across European seas: Legal, institutional, and financial drivers and barriers. *Marine Pollution Bulletin*, 2021, 170.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpolbul.2021.112611>
 22. Guarnieri P, Bianchini A, Rossi J, Câmara e Silva L, Trojan F, Lizot M, *et al.* Transitioning towards a circular economy under a multicriteria and the new institutional theory perspective: A comparison between Italy and Brazil. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 2023, 409. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2023.137094>
 23. Hoang DP, Vu TH. A transaction cost explanation of the card-or-cash decision among Vietnamese debit card holders. *International Journal of Bank Marketing*,2020;38(7):1635–1664.
<https://doi.org/10.1108/IJBM-05-2019-0191>
 24. Ketokivi M, Mahoney JT. Transaction Cost Economics as a Theory of Supply Chain Efficiency. *Production and Operations Management*,2020;29(4):1011–1031.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13148>
 25. Khalil EL. Dignity entitlements contra property rights: are all preferences reducible to a single metric? *Cogent Social Sciences*,2024;10(1):2371492.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2024.2371492>
 26. Li Z, Tong TW, Xu M. Property Rights and Firm Scope. *Journal of Management*,2025;51(2):637–669.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/01492063231195595>
 27. Liu J, Zhang D, Cai J, Davenport J. Legal Systems, National Governance and Renewable Energy Investment: Evidence from Around the World. *British Journal of Management*,2021;32(3):579–610.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8551.12377>
 28. Maskus KE. Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Inequality: Theory and Evidence1. *Stockholm Intellectual Property Law Review*,2022;1:44–51.
<https://doi.org/10.53292/2d3a6004.50f031e5>
 29. Ninyio NN. Foreign Direct Investment in Nigeria: Challenges and Prospects. *KAS African Law Study Library - Librairie Africaine d'Etudes Juridiques*,2024;11(4):617–634.
<https://doi.org/10.5771/2363-6262-2024-4-617>
 30. Osuma G, Ayinde A, Ntokozo N, Ehikioya B. Evaluating the impact of systemic corruption and political risk on foreign direct investment inflows in Nigeria: an analysis of key determinants. *Discover Sustainability*,2024;5(1):1–9.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s43621-024-00676-7>
 31. Patil K, Garg V, Gabaldon J, Patil H, Niranjan S, Hawkins T. Firm performance in digitally integrated supply chains: a combined perspective of transaction cost economics and relational exchange theory. *Journal of Enterprise Information Management*, 2023.
<https://doi.org/10.1108/JEIM-09-2022-0335>
 32. Sitaloppi J, Ballardini RM. Promoting systemic collaboration for sustainable innovation through intellectual property rights. *Journal of Co-Operative Organization and Management*, 2023, 11(1).
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcom.2023.100200>
 33. Stevenson R, McMahon SR, Ciuchta MP, Letwin C. More than capital? Transaction costs, trade-offs, and value for small businesses in novel funding transactions. *Journal of Small Business Management*, 2023. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00472778.2023.2204501>
 34. Swanson TM, Barzel Y, Libecap GD. Economic Analysis of Property Rights. *The Economic Journal*, 1992, 102(410). <https://doi.org/10.2307/2234867>
 35. Tomašević I, Đurović S, Abramović N, Weis L, Koval V. Factors Influencing Accounting Outsourcing Using the Transaction Cost Economics Model. *International Journal of Financial Studies*,2023;11(2):61.
<https://doi.org/10.3390/ijfs11020061>
 36. Trejo-Pech CO, Servín-Juárez R, Reyes-Duarte Á. What sets cooperative farmers apart from non-cooperative farmers? A transaction cost economics analysis of coffee farmers in Mexico. *Agricultural and Food Economics*, 2023, 11(1).
<https://doi.org/10.1186/s40100-023-00256-9>
 37. Verbeke A, Kano L. The Transaction Cost Economics Theory of the Family Firm: Family-Based Human Asset Specificity and the Bifurcation Bias. *Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice*,2012;36(6):1183–1205.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6520.2012.00545.x>
 38. Victoria OI, Opuala-Charles S. Impact of Ease of Doing Business on Foreign Direct Investment in Nigeria. *Journal of Economics Management Research*,2023;4(2):1–9.
[https://doi.org/10.47363/jesmr/2023\(4\)174](https://doi.org/10.47363/jesmr/2023(4)174)
 39. Wang F, Zhang R, Ahmed F, Shah SMM. Impact of investment behaviour on financial markets during COVID-19: a case of the UK. *Economic Research-Ekonomska Istrazivanja*,2022;35(1):2273–2291.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2021.1939089>
 40. Xiang Q, Li J, Liu G. The impact of rural collective property rights reform on income and poverty reduction: Evidence from China's rural regions. *PLoS ONE*, 2024, 19(9 September).
<https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0308393>
 41. Xu X, Duan L, Li Y. Local Corruption and Corporate Investment: Political Catering or Innovation Driven? *Asian-Pacific Economic Literature*, 2025.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/apel.70022>
 42. Yao BH, Shanoyan A, Schwab B, Amanor-Boadu V. Mobile money, transaction costs, and market participation: evidence from Côte d'Ivoire and Tanzania. *Food Policy*, 2022, 112.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2022.102370>
 43. Yekini A. The effectiveness of foreign jurisdiction clauses in Nigeria: an empirical inquiry. *Journal of Private International Law*,2023;19(1):67–91.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/17441048.2023.2189102>
 44. Zheng Y, Han W, Yang R. Does government behaviour or enterprise investment improve regional innovation performance? Evidence from China. *International Journal of Technology Management*,2021;85(2–4):274–296. <https://doi.org/10.1504/IJTM.2021.115266>