



Equity in competition: Tracing the evolution of antitrust laws for social justice

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Abstract

In this work, the authors investigate competition laws' contribution to social justice from a critical standpoint. This paper examines the fundamental ideas of competition law with the goals of advancing consumer protection, market efficiency, and economic advancement. This paper goes beyond the conventional goals to investigate the ways in which competition laws relate to more general social justice issues.

This paper evaluates if laws pertaining to competition have promoted social fairness by means of a thorough investigation and legal analysis. The author examines how well they address systemic inequities and advance equitable results, drawing on case studies and jurisprudential developments.

While navigating the complexity of competition law it is essential to assess how to accomplish social justice goals through the application of legal frameworks. This paper examines how legislators, civic society, and competition authorities work together to create regulatory environments that put equality and diversity first.

This paper will also attempt to decipher the intricacies and subtleties present in this symbiotic connection by combining theoretical understanding, and legal analysis and shed light on the degree to which competition laws have succeeded—or failed—in promoting social justice by critically analysing the historical development of competition laws, following their theoretical foundations, and exploring their practical ramifications.

In the end, this study aims to provide light on how competition laws affect social justice. The authors hope to find ways to improve the synergy between competition law and more general social justice imperatives by evaluating successes and failures. Follow along to assess how competition laws affect social justice and investigate avenues for achieving a fairer community.

Keywords: Competition Law, Antitrust Law, social justice, social welfare, inequality

Introduction

In the complicated tapestry of modern economies, the confluence of competition laws and social justice emerges as a major focal point, encompassing the balance between market forces and societal fairness.

Competition laws have long been praised as essential pillars of market regulation, promoting efficiency, defending consumer interests, and accelerating economic growth. In fact they are designed to promote fair competition and prevent anti-competitive behaviour^[1]. However, its more general implications for social justice—the fair allocation of opportunities and resources throughout society which have sparked discussion and reflection in recent years^[1].

With worsening inequality in a majority of the world, the need for a system to ensure checks and balances is needed. This is where the goals of competition law align with more general social justice imperatives to deal with complex economic and social issues including inequality.

The potential of competition laws to serve as vehicles for social justice is profound and multifaceted, ranging from addressing income inequality and guaranteeing universal access to essential goods and services to protecting labour rights and empowering marginalised communities^[3].

In light of this, this study sets out to conduct a thorough investigation of the relationship between social justice and competition law with the goal of highlighting their complex interactions and assessing their overall effects on the welfare of society.

This paper will utilise doctrinal methodology including referring to a range of case studies and legal precedents, to

extract practical lessons and pinpoint avenues for improving the congruence between competition law and more general societal goals^[4].

Through this paper, the author hopes to better understand the complex relationships between social justice and competition laws and direct the framework towards inclusivity and equity in the twenty-first century, guided by the values of fairness, inclusivity, and distributive justice^[5].

The Evolution of Competition Laws

Competition laws, sometimes referred to as antitrust laws, have evolved significantly over time to reflect shifts in human ideals, economic structures, and technological breakthroughs.

While modern competition/antitrust laws were developed in the late 19th Century, traces of it could be found in market and economic regulation going all the way back to the classical civilisations of Greece, Rome, and Mesopotamia.

During the Industrial Revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries, contemporary competition laws emerged in reaction to the significant economic changes brought about by rapid industrialisation^[6] where large businesses and trusts gained significant economic influence raising worries about possible abuses of that power to hurt consumers and hinder competition. It became clear that monopolistic actions might result in higher pricing, lower-quality products, and less innovation as competition declined in the absence of intervention^[7].

Coming to modern times, the Sherman Antitrust Act, was passed by the US in 1890, in a landmark decision that

established the framework for contemporary competition law^[8]. The legislation, which bears Senator John Sherman's name, was designed to combat monopolies and curb anti-competitive behaviour in the marketplace^[9]. Fundamentally, the Sherman Antitrust Act outlawed a number of actions that were thought to be detrimental to competition^[10]. The act specifically prohibits price-fixing, which occurs when rivals band together to set prices unnecessarily high, bid-rigging, which occurs when rivals manipulate the bidding process to guarantee predetermined outcomes, and market allocation agreements, which occur when rivals split markets among themselves to prevent competition^[11].

Sherman Act aimed to promote a more competitive market where innovation could flourish, pricing could stay fair, and consumers could benefit from a greater range of options by making anticompetitive acts illegal^[12].

Antitrust laws were substantially expanded and improved in the early 20th century in response to shifting corporate practices and shifting economic realities^[13]. The Sherman Act was strengthened by the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, which outlawed certain anticompetitive practices such as exclusive dealing, tying agreements, and mergers that materially reduced competition. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was also founded to look into unfair corporate practices and enforce antitrust laws, which further institutionalised competition regulation in the US^[14].

As nations realised how crucial it was to foster competition and oppose monopolistic tactics for both economic growth and consumer welfare, the concepts of competition regulation extended from the United States to other regions of the world during the 20th century. European nations started passing their own antitrust legislation, such as the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which established the framework for EU competition policy. To combat anti-competitive behaviour, other nations, such as Australia and Japan, also created their own regulatory bodies and competition laws^[15].

There were discussions over the objectives and strategies of antitrust enforcement throughout the second half of the 20th century, especially in the US. Under the direction of academics like Robert Bork and Richard Posner, the Chicago School of economic theory promoted a laxer approach to antitrust enforcement, placing more emphasis on consumer welfare and efficiency than on the tight supervision of monopolies. Nonetheless, ongoing enforcement actions and court interventions to stop anti-competitive behaviour were motivated by worries about market dominance and its detrimental consequences on competition and innovation^[16].

The emergence of digital technology and globalisation provide new difficulties for competition laws in the twenty-first century^[17]. Global policymakers are debating how to modify conventional antitrust frameworks to meet these contemporary issues, which has sparked fresh discussions and legislative ideas to modernise competition laws for the internet era in the form of legislations such as the Digital Markets Act in the EU.

Intersection of Competition Law with the concept of Social Justice

The idea of social justice intersects with several theoretical bases that support competition legislation. The context for comprehending how competition policy advances justice, equality, and welfare in society is provided by these theories.

Efficiency: The economic theory of efficiency, which holds that competitive markets result in efficient resource allocation, improved production, and increased customer welfare, is the foundation of competition legislation. The entire benefit of society is intended to be maximised by competition laws, which work to promote competition and inhibit monopolistic behaviour. This viewpoint ensures that resources are allocated in a way that benefits the largest number of people, which is consistent with social justice values^[18].

Consumer Welfare: The preservation of consumer welfare, which includes more options, lower costs, and higher-quality goods and services, is at the heart of competition legislation. Competition laws protect consumers' interests by banning anti-competitive behaviour, especially by protecting the interests of marginalised or disadvantaged groups. By guaranteeing fair access to necessities, putting consumer welfare first advances social justice.

Market Structure: Theories of market structure, which acknowledge that oligopolies and monopolies may stifle competition and hurt consumers and smaller rivals, serve as the foundation for competition legislation. Competition laws establish a fair playing field where businesses compete on the basis of merit by encouraging competitive market structures. This reflects social justice ideas by promoting inclusion and fair opportunity for all market participants^[19].

Innovation: Competition laws are beginning to place more emphasis on how innovation propels both societal advancement and economic success. Competitiveness encourages businesses to innovate and enhance their processes and goods, which promotes long-term economic growth. This focus on innovation supports the objectives of social justice by generating chances for economic empowerment and mobility, especially for historically marginalised groups^[20].

Distributional Effects: While efficiency and consumer welfare are the main goals of competition laws, they also have an impact on how money and resources are distributed across society. Because certain people and businesses benefit disproportionately from competitive marketplaces, income inequality may worsen. Therefore, in order to solve distributional issues and advance social justice, competition laws must be supplemented by other measures, such as progressive taxation^[21].

A background on Indian Competition Laws

The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (MRTP Act) marked India's inaugural step in regulating competition. Under the direction of K.C. Das Gupta, the government created the Monopolies Inquiry Commission (MIC) in April 1964.

The Indian Constitution's basic principles of state policy, which seek to ensure social justice with economic prosperity, served as the model for the Act. The unrestricted interaction of forces driving competition, maximum material development via rational resource allocation, the availability of high-quality goods and services at competitive pricing, and, ultimately, a just and fair bargain for consumers are the tenets upon which the MRTP Act is based.

In 1991, India implemented the New Economic Policy (NEP), a sweeping economic and financial reform aimed at fostering Liberalisation, Privatisation, and Globalisation (LPG) [22]. This pivotal shift marked a significant departure from India's previously closed economic policies, opening up its economy to global markets and competition across various sectors. The NEP's introduction of LPG principles catalysed a transformative wave of competition throughout the Indian economic landscape [23].

Recognising the need for a more robust regulatory framework to effectively manage competition, India replaced the MRTP Act with the Competition Act in 2002 [24].

The Competition Act, 2002, heralded the establishment of the Competition Commission of India (CCI), a regulatory authority tasked with ensuring fair competition and preventing anti-competitive practices in the market. By empowering the CCI to investigate and penalise anti-competitive behavior, the Competition Act aimed to foster a level playing field, stimulate innovation, and promote consumer welfare in the increasingly competitive Indian market.

Linking point of Competition Law and Article 39 of the Constitution of India

The Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP), which are established in the Indian Constitution, provide the foundation of competition policy in India. These ideals operate as a framework for the state to create laws and policies based on. In particular, Article 38 of the Indian Constitution talks about how to advance people's welfare by ensuring a social structure that supports the advancement of economic prosperity. By highlighting the significance of encouraging healthy competition and guaranteeing an equal allocation of resources to support economic growth and development, this essay establishes the framework for competition policy in India [25].

The foundation of Indian competition policy is found in Article 38 of the Constitution, which places a strong emphasis on advancing social and economic wellbeing. The state seeks to guarantee fair resource allocation, advance consumer welfare, and stimulate economic growth and development via encouraging competition and prohibiting anti-competitive behaviour [26].

The Indian court has played a pivotal role in developing the country's competition policy. A strong competition law regime has been developed in the nation as a result of the Supreme Court and many high courts actively participating in the interpretation and enforcement of competition law [27]. Furthermore, the values embodied in Article 38 are strengthened by other pertinent sections of the Constitution, like Article 14, which guarantees equality before the law and forbids discrimination, and Article 39, which instructs the state to guarantee that ownership and control of material resources are distributed to serve the common good. These guidelines place a strong emphasis on the value of encouraging social welfare and economic prosperity by preventing anti-competitive behaviour and fostering a healthy competitive environment. India's dedication to establishing a competitive market environment that promotes efficiency, innovation, and consumer welfare is reflected in the development of competition legislation and policy, which began with the MRTP Act and ended with the Competition Act.

Important case laws in India

To assess the success and the failure of the Indian competition regime in redressing anti-competitive questions and grievances and understand where consumers and their welfare stand in a rapidly growing economy it is essential to look at relevant case laws and their impact.

▪ **CCI vs. Coordination Committee of Artists and Technicians of W. B. Film and Television Industry & Ors. (2017)** [28]

In this instance, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) punished a film association for participating in anti-competitive behaviour by banning artists who disobeyed its rules. This case made clear how crucial competition law is to maintaining free markets and discouraging monopolistic behaviour in the entertainment sector, which promotes consumer choice and economic well being.

▪ **CCI vs. National Stock Exchange of India (2011)** [29]

Allegations were made in this lawsuit that the National Stock Exchange (NSE) had engaged in unfair trading practices to misuse its dominant position. Due to the CCI's involvement, the NSE was forced to take remedial action, which ensured the financial market's fair competition and the welfare of investors and other market players.

▪ **CCI vs. DLF Limited (2011):**

In this instance, the CCI punished well-known real estate developer DLF Limited for abusing its dominant position by subjecting purchasers to unjust and discriminatory terms. By taking this action, the CCI was able to safeguard the interests of consumers, increase market competition, and advance the real estate industry's economic well being.

▪ **Monsanto Holdings Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. vs. CCI & Ors. (2016)**

In this instance, the international agricultural biotechnology company Monsanto was penalised by the Competition Commission of India (CCI) for allegedly abusing its dominating position in the market for genetically modified (GM) cotton seeds. Critics countered that the CCI's efforts fell short of sufficiently addressing more general issues pertaining to the rights of farmers, the availability of seeds, and the socioeconomic effects of genetically modified agriculture on India's smallholder farmers.

▪ **Excel Crop Care Ltd. v. Competition Commission of India & Ors. (2017)** [20]

In this instance, Excel Crop Care Ltd. and other agrochemical businesses were fined by the Competition Commission of India (CCI) for allegedly banding together to regulate prices and restrict the supply of specific herbicides. Concerns were voiced over the effects of anti-competitive behaviours on farmers' access to inexpensive inputs and the wider socio-economic ramifications for agricultural production and rural life, even though the CCI's measures were intended to promote fair competition.

▪ **Fastway Transmission Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Ortel Communications Ltd. & Ors. (2018)** [31]

In this case, there were claims that cable television distribution networks had abused their power in some parts of India. Concerns over the cost and accessibility of

television services remained, particularly for low-income households and marginalised populations, even after the CCI found the cable operators guilty of anti-competitive actions, including discriminatory pricing and denial of access.

▪ **Reliance Industries Limited & Ors. v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited & Ors. (2015)** ^[32]

The CCI looked into claims that two of the biggest oil firms, Reliance Industries Limited and Indian Oil Corporation Limited, conspired to control gasoline prices and restrict competition in the petroleum industry. Although the corporations implicated were penalised as a result of the CCI's findings, concerns were expressed regarding the wider consequences for consumer welfare, energy security, and socioeconomic development.

▪ **Poultry Federation of India v. Competition Commission of India & Ors. (2018)** ^[33]

Allegations of price-fixing and cartelization among Indian chicken merchants and producers were at issue in this case. The impact of anti-competitive tactics on food affordability, nutritional security, and the socio-economic well-being of consumers—particularly in rural and low-income areas—was a worry voiced despite the CCI fining the accused parties.

The effectiveness of Indian competition laws in advancing social welfare has come under examination and discussion in recent times. Even though CCI has made great progress in upholding competition laws to safeguard consumer interests and improve market efficiency, there are still issues with adequately addressing more general socio-economic issues and guaranteeing fair results for all societal groups ^[34].

In several economic areas, the CCI's enforcement measures against anti-competitive behaviours including cartelisation, abuse of dominance, and unfair trade practices have surely aided in promoting competition, averting market distortions, and defending the welfare of consumers. The CCI's function in preserving fair competition and levelling the playing field has been highlighted by high-profile cases involving large firms, such as those in the infrastructure, telecommunications, and pharmaceutical sectors ^[35].

Obstacles in promoting social welfare and enforcing competition laws in India

Developing multi-stakeholder engagement, bolstering regulatory procedures, and addressing systemic difficulties are necessary steps to fully use competition laws for the purpose of promoting social justice, inclusive growth, and economic development in India.

Nonetheless, the efficacy of Indian competition laws in promoting social welfare goals is still context-specific and subtle. To better match competition law enforcement with more general socio-economic objectives, a number of obstacles and constraints must be overcome:

- **Complexity and Length of Legal Proceedings:** The CCI and appellate tribunals sometimes need drawn-out legal proceedings, which causes delays in the resolution of competition matters. This can make it more difficult to take prompt action against anti-competitive behaviour and lessen the negative consequences it has on consumers, particularly in quickly changing markets ^[36].

- **Restricted Scope of Remedies:** Although the CCI is able to issue cease-and-desist orders and impose fines, there may not be enough remedies available to address structural problems that are deeply ingrained in society and impact social welfare, such as market concentration, income inequality, and obstacles to small business entry ^[37].

- **Sector-Specific Difficulties:** Some industries, such as digital platforms, healthcare, and agriculture, have particular difficulties that can call for sector-specific regulatory actions in addition to standard competition law enforcement. A comprehensive policy strategy that integrates competition legislation with sectoral laws and public policy efforts is necessary to address issues pertaining to the cost, accessibility, and quality of critical products and services in these sectors ^[38].

- **Building Capacity and Raising Awareness:** In order to maximise the influence of competition laws on social welfare outcomes, it is imperative that regulatory bodies be given greater capacity, that competition advocacy be fostered, and that stakeholders—consumers, firms, and policymakers—be made more aware of the rules.

Competition law and income inequality

There is an increase in social and economic inequality. Since the early 1970s, the middle class's income is stagnating, while the wealthy are getting richer ^[39], and the poor are fighting just to make ends meet.

These patterns have become more pronounced in light of the present economic slump and growing expense of living as the overall wealth of the globe, and industrialised nations in particular, has increased significantly, but the benefits of this rise have been largely unequally distributed.

The story of contemporary inequality is intricate and influenced by a wide range of elements, including institutional endowment, sociological and political tendencies, historical, legal, and economic settings, as well as current governmental policies on taxes, spending, investment, and growth ^[40].

While many people would agree that tools and policies, such as taxes and subsidies, are the best ways to close the inequality gap, the disparity in wealth continues to grow. Over the last few decades, public policies have failed to adequately address this gap, which can be attributed to a variety of factors such as fundamental cultural and economic impediments, government failure, ideology, or capture.

Politicians and policy makers who hold the major levers must exert a great deal of effort to enact change including implementation of competition law to attempt to address the growing inequality gap. Our consideration of competition law as a potential supplementary tool stems from the poor effectiveness of conventional (and theoretically ideal) tools.

There are two main interfaces that competition legislation may target when examining the possible impact it may have on income, consumption, and wealth inequality.

The first interface—which we will call "internal"—deals with the potential for integrating equality concerns into the analysis of anti-competitive behaviour. Essentially, this will frequently need broadening the competition laws' objectives to include addressing inequality. The second interface—

which we will call "external"—disregards the competition laws' normative scope, or the competition's objectives, and instead focuses on the impact that competition law enforcement has on fostering increased competition.

▪ **Internal Provisions**

The utilization of internal provisions within competition laws to address inequality presents a significant interface between competition regulation and social justice. In jurisdictions such as South Africa^[41], specific references to equality are directly incorporated into competition laws, reflecting broader constitutional mandates for affirmative action and empowerment of historically disadvantaged groups^[42]. Similarly, the competition laws of the European Union, Indonesia, South Korea^[43], and Taiwan encompass values such as fairness, consumer protection, and economic welfare, which indirectly target inequality through broader policy considerations.

The inclusion of such parameters allows competition agencies to consider inequality when assessing the permissibility of mergers, agreements, or unilateral actions, potentially prohibiting activities that exacerbate inequality while permitting those that mitigate it. However, the inclusion of fairness and equality parameters raises contentious issues regarding subjective value judgments, quantification challenges, and legal uncertainty. It also sparks debates on the appropriate scope and purpose of competition law, as well as the role of competition enforcers in addressing broader societal issues traditionally within the purview of elected officials.

While some jurisdictions embrace the consideration of fairness and equality, others remain hesitant, reflecting diverse political and social constructs underlying competition laws. Ultimately, the utilization of internal provisions to address inequality remains available in select jurisdictions and is often applied restrictively, contributing to ongoing normative debates surrounding the essence and function of competition law^[44].

▪ **External Dynamics**

The external interface of competition law enforcement is examined, exploring how it affects competitive dynamics and, in turn, economic inequality^[45]. This interface, referred to as "external," is unique in that it is not within the normative purview of the law, especially in terms of the absence of explicit measures meant to advance justice or lessen inequality. It centres on the ways in which economic inequality may be reduced by the efficient use of competition legislation, including merger control, probes into market and sector inquiries, anticompetitive agreements and abuse of market dominance, and advocacy initiatives.

The fundamental idea is that strict enforcement of antitrust laws increases market competition, which in turn reduces economic inequality. These external impacts take in several forms, all of which are mediated by increased market competitiveness. Competition law enforcement encourages competitive dynamics in marketplaces for goods and services, which lowers costs and improves quality of services^[46].

Competitive pricing helps customers by providing better value for their money and facilitating access to a greater choice of goods and services, especially for those with lower means. Furthermore, labour demand is stimulated by rivalry in product marketplaces, which affects employment

levels and pay. On the other hand, when lower-class groups are priced out of product marketplaces and rent-seeking behaviour is encouraged, the existence of market power can worsen inequality.

When it comes to labour markets, wage growth, income, and labour supply are impacted by effective competition law enforcement. Workers may have fewer job possibilities and lower salaries as a result of monopoly market power, in which a small number of employers has substantial negotiating power over wages. However, because people have different positions in the labour and product markets, the link between market competitiveness and inequality is complex. Increased competition may be good for customers, but it may also be bad for low-skilled employees of companies with large market shares.

A hypothetical situation illustrates how, depending on a number of variables including ownership of shares, unionisation, and skill level, market power may both increase and decrease inequality. The intricate relationship that exists between inequality and market competitiveness emphasises the necessity of determining systematic winners and losers as well as taking into account factors like the labour share of national revenue. Throughout the 1980s, rising inequality has been connected in many industrialised nations to a fall in the labour share, which is frequently related to the emergence of "Superstar" enterprises and greater market dominance^[47].

The implementation of competition law enforcement has the capacity to mitigate economic inequality; nevertheless, its efficacy is dependent on a number of circumstances, such as the structure of society, ownership patterns, technical developments, and international trade patterns^[48].

Strategies to Enhance the Creation and Implementation of Competition Policies

a. Create a custom competition legislation, policy, and enforcement system

Developing nations have several obstacles to compete. In these nations, the necessity for an efficient competition law and policy is critical. However, it is far more difficult to execute competition legislation and policy in developing nations than in industrialised ones due to different market features as well as challenges with legality and enforcement. Large informal sectors, issues with small scale and high entry hurdles, challenges establishing a culture of competition, and capacity and political economy limitations are a few of these reasons. As a result, it is crucial that each nation customise its competition legislation and how it is applied within these limitations;

b. Work to create a culture of competition

Creating a "culture of competition" that entails public awareness of the advantages of competition and widespread support for a robust policy of competition. Communication regarding the advantages of competitive markets to all segments of society, including consumers, businesses, trade unions, schools, the legal community, government and regulatory authorities, and judges, is necessary for this continuous process;

c. Promote the filing of complaints

Knowledgeable customers and businesses are more likely to recognise potential anti-competitive behaviour and to report it. As mentioned earlier, the most prevalent source of

information concerning hitherto undisclosed cartels has been and probably will be complaints to the competition agency in emerging nations. It must guarantee that, to the greatest degree possible, the complainants' identities be kept secret;

d. Start putting together a programme of leniency

The term "begin" is crucial. It is unrealistic to expect the agency to see benefits right away from the simple establishment of a leniency programme. The competition agency must first establish its credibility by demonstrating that it will find cartels, prosecute them effectively, and punish those found guilty with harsh penalties. A well-designed leniency scheme will be successful after this credibility has been built;

e. Concentrate early investigation efforts on industries where cartel activity is most likely to occur

Although cartels may arise in any economic sector, there is now overwhelming evidence that certain sectors are more prone to see them than others, particularly when it comes to developing nations. Those industries should be the new competition agency's primary areas of attention. However, one area where sector studies could be useful is public procurement. Analysing bid activity in scenarios where bid rigging is suspected might reveal trends that point to bid rotation or customer allocation. Such investigations have to be carried out with the support of an experienced procurement officer who is capable of accurately interpreting the data;

f. Start enforcing severe penalties for cartel behaviour

An aggressive strategy of penalty is an essential component of any effective anti-cartel programme. Sanctions can take many different forms, including administrative fines imposed on companies and individuals, criminal penalties such as fines and incarceration, and the recovery of compensating damages by cartel victims. The most frequent penalties imposed on businesses are administrative ones with financial fines which can be mitigated due to their scale of operation. If on the other hand corporations or their promoters engaging in cartel activities fear personal punishment, such as jail (in a small number of countries) or significant fines^[49] they may try to avoid such behaviour;

g. Inform the people about the damage that cartels bring about

It is necessary to implement an education campaign about the harm that cartels inflict in order to foster support for severe penalties in situations involving them;

h. Participate in global collaboration in the endeavour to enforce competition legislation

In order to combat covert, multinational agreements, the international competition community is attempting to find ways to increase collaboration. International agencies that have long been involved in researching and documenting hardline cartels include UNCTAD and the OECD^[50] as well as officials from the competition agencies who convene yearly to deliberate on strategies for enforcing anti-cartel laws for the previous seven years. The International Competition Network has initiated a campaign aimed at tackling the obstacles that both domestic and international cartels pose to anti-cartel enforcement;

i. Conduct peer reviews

The goal of UNCTAD's Voluntary Peer Review on Competition Policy is to improve the standard and efficacy of the framework for enforcing competition laws in developing nations and economies undergoing transition. It examines how competition policy is reflected in competition law and considers how well institutions and institutional structures work to enforce competition law;

Conclusion

To sum up, the investigation of the connection between social justice and competition laws uncovers a nuanced interaction that goes well beyond the boundaries of market regulation. Competition laws have long been praised for their contribution to efficiency and consumer welfare, but more and more people are talking about and considering their wider implications for social justice.

Finding a balance between the objectives of competition law and the demands of social justice becomes crucial as we negotiate the complexity of contemporary economies and face the many issues that face society. Our research highlights the need for a more comprehensive strategy to regulate competition, one that puts distributive justice, fairness, and inclusion above merely market efficiency.

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